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Restore, Revive, Transform: A Review of Policy Proposals for a New Transatlantic Relationship

By Maddy Ghose, Transatlantic Analyst

Speaking before a crowd in Munich a few months after Donald Trump’s inauguration, Angela Merkel announced that the time of fully relying on others had come to an end. “We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands,” said Merkel.[1] This statement came on the heels of a G7 summit which European leaders initially feared Trump would not attend. Ultimately, however, Trump’s attendance did little to assuage fears about the perceived risks his election posed to “the entire Western architecture, post Second World War.”[2] These early harbingers became the trajectory of the entire transatlantic relationship in the years to come. Now, with Joe Biden’s election to the American presidency, diplomatic and academic circles alike are rife with proposals and projections for how to best redirect that relationship back into one of fruitful cooperation and partnership.

Introduction – Choose Your Words Wisely

Some of these proposals for redirection are optimistic, others less so. Nevertheless, all of them seek to transform the relationship from its current iteration. One of the key differences right out of the gate, however, is how this relationship should be changed, and to what extent. Actors who benefited more from the pre-Trump status quo are championing some sort of return to those conditions. Others who filled the void left by the Trump administration are advocating for a more transformative path. Altogether, the proposals analyzed in this piece roughly fit into three groups based on the language used to describe their preferred trajectory for the transatlantic relationship with Biden on the team.

The sprawling proposal Biden recently wrote for Foreign Affairs calls for a restoration – the transatlantic relationship can go back to the pre-Trump status quo, with the United States “back at the head of the table.”[3] German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer echoes this idea, calling on her colleagues in Europe to “acknowledge that, for the foreseeable future, we will remain dependent.”[4] Meanwhile, Kramp-Karrenbauer’s counterpart in Poland, Mariusz Błaszczak, is “pleased with the recent change in messaging among [Poland’s] key European allies, especially the Germans,” and agrees fully with this sentiment of restoration.[5]

Other proposals are more cautious, focusing instead on the task of jumpstarting a relationship that has, in some areas, at best, gone dormant. The Wilson Center presents its “overhaul” of the Dayton Accords as a chance “for the United States to revive its partnership with the EU.”[6] Pierre Morcos, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), offers a “restart.”[7] And Daniel Hegedüs, writing for the German Marshall Fund (GMF) about Central and Eastern Europe under a Biden administration, urges a “constructive reset.”[8]

Recently, the European Union introduced its “agenda for global change” with more neutral, status quo language – such as “maintenance and renewal.”[9] However, this initial restraint quickly gives way to a comprehensive yet succinct proposal for a total transformation of the transatlantic relationship. Others follow suit. The French and German Foreign Ministers, Jean-Yves Le Drian and Heiko Maas, respectively, wrote for The Washington Post that European sovereignty and European-American collaboration are “two sides of the same coin,” making their case for multilateralism and a transatlantic “New Deal.”[10] A policy brief by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), proposing “an action plan for transformation, not restoration,” goes a step further by asserting that Biden’s election is a reflection of a desire in America for “a Europe that is a sovereign partner, not a helpless dependent.”[11] And the Atlantic Council’s Frederick Kempe makes his case for a new Global Charter, “in the same spirit as the Atlantic Charter.” [12] Moreover, Kempe’s idea is similar to the Coalition for a World Security Community, which suggests “the enlargement and transformation of NATO into a World Security Community open to all democratic nations,”[13] or to Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s Alliance of Democracies.[14]

Democracy, Security, Trade, Climate and Health: Core Issues, Critical Differences


With some exceptions, each proposal in this piece tackles the same set of core issues. We begin with the most prevalent issue: democracy. Biden’s piece lays out his plans for a global summit of democratic countries, dubbed a “Summit for Democracy,” for which much support has been expressed by European leaders, and promises commitments to advance human rights, combat corruption, and stave off authoritarianism. Biden also mentions a comprehensive, four billion dollar regional strategy, which would require individual country contributions to take up cohesive, verifiable reforms.[15] The ECFR lists “the defence [sic] of democracy” as one of the keystones of its conceptual “transatlantic bargain,” and suggests that the United States join the D-10 group.[16] Furthermore, in 2020 Boris Johnson proposed a new D-10 group – comprising the G7 countries along with India, Australia, and South Korea – to counterbalance the threat of China.[17] Execution of this idea would allow the United States and Europe to carry out joint agendas of democratic renewals at home and abroad. And lastly, Hegedüs argues that greater American investment in Central and Eastern Europe will prevent democratic backsliding in the region, as has happened in Poland and Hungary in recent years. Hegedüs also stakes the credibility of the United States on its ability to re-establish its traditional role as “a global proponent of democracy,” which could be achieved in Central and Eastern Europe through relaunching or increasing support to US programs backing civil society and free media in the region.[18]


Security is another one of the more pervasive core issues appearing in many of these proposals. The issues within the various security debates reveal one of the structural limitations for redirecting the transatlantic relationship: the desire of many to construct a symbiosis between the United States and European Union will be hampered by individual needs, both inwards- and outwards-looking. Overall, the split lies in how active a role the United States should play. Trump made the issue of burden-sharing among NATO members a divisive one, expressing derogatory remarks at countries that had not met the 2% GDP defense spending mark.[19] The European Commission addresses this concern in its global agenda, stating that the European Union will strengthen its “joint commitment to transatlantic and international security, starting by establishing a new EU-US Security and Defense Dialogue.”[20] But, this sentiment is echoed by only a few of the proposals analyzed here. For instance, the ECFR concedes in its “transatlantic bargain” proposal that the European Union and United States can agree on a division of labor between meeting China in the Pacific and Russia in Eastern Europe, but a “new metric of commitment to transatlantic security” is a prerequisite. The ECFR does not specify how this new metric may look, but clarifies that it would “require the US to accept a new, broader burden-sharing concept, but one that would appeal to its priorities in the provision of capabilities and defence [sic] procurement.”[21]

In another piece, the ECFR observes that, in any case, the European Union still has not upgraded its policies to fulfill requirements that strategic autonomy would ask of EU member states. The most direct way to upgrade policies, according to the ECFR, would be by creating an Eastern Partnership Security Compact, which “would align the EU’s funds and institutions with the capabilities of member states that are willing to boost security cooperation in eastern Europe.”[22] At the same time, Hegedüs challenges the United States to overcome “its rather unidimensional offer…as a security provider lacking the geoeconomic weight of the EU, Russia, and China,” but without giving the impression that Washington is interfering with Brussels’ policies. In order to solve this issue, Hegedüs recommends strategically bolstering American investments in Central and Eastern Europe.[23] Comparatively, Morcos expresses uncertainty over how willing Washington will be to “reengage in Europe’s increasingly unstable neighborhood,” regardless of which theater. According to Morcos, the European Union will need to respond to this uncertainty by “tak[ing] on much greater responsibility diplomatically as well as militarily…but with the acknowledgement that U.S. security presence plays an essential role.”[24]

Biden himself alludes to Morcos’ projection of limited American reengagement, hinging American national security upon its economic security, stating that the United States will support NATO but diplomacy should remain “the first instrument.”[25] Part of the President-elect’s campaign platform was his promise to “rebuild a modern, agile U.S. Department of State—investing in and re-empowering the finest diplomatic corps in the world.”[26] This is a thinly-veiled response to the Trump administration’s gutting of the State Department’s budget and higher prioritization of military voices in matters traditionally left to diplomats and the Foreign Service.[27] Biden’s clear commitments to supporting and funding the State Department and the Foreign Service embody his desire for diplomacy to be the first instrument in American foreign policy.

On the other end of the spectrum, the Polish and German defense ministers wholeheartedly agree that the United States ought to be the guarantor of security for Europe, the pivotal foundation of Atlanticism.[28] Yet countries relying on the United States for conventional security, such as Poland, have fundamentally different needs in the conversation than Germany, for example. In fact, Trump took steps to shift the United States military’s presence in Europe eastward, reducing troops in Germany and moving them to Poland. Piotr Buras makes the crucial observation, however, that “a traditional pro-Atlantic stance (support for NATO) will no longer be sufficient.”[29] Poland will be one of the cornerstones of NATO’s eastern policies going forward, if it can become the partner Biden expects it to be. Therefore, Poland must make strides in areas of policy, namely social and normative ones, about which it has so far been reluctant to do. The most recent and intensive instance of socio-normative division between Brussels and Warsaw has been the issue of LGBT+ rights, or lack thereof, under the strictly conservative Law and Justice (PiS) ruling party in Poland. All in all, Poland’s overall trend of democratic backsliding has been a worrying development for some years now, and it was part of the motivation behind the rule of law conditionality clause written into the proposed EU 2021-2027 budget, that which the Polish government initially vetoed.[30]


Throughout the various proposals, trade is generally viewed as another thorn in the side of those seeking to rebuild the transatlantic relationship. Once again, Biden is cautious yet inclusive. Biden wants his administration to resist global protectionism, “lead efforts internationally to bring transparency to the global financial system,” pursue illicit tax havens, and work against leaders plundering their private sectors.[31] The ECFR, writing that trade issues are an inevitability, points specifically to “differences on agricultural goods, privacy, and the role of US tech giants.” Similarly to Biden, though, the ECFR has transatlantic unity in mind, suggesting that, in exchange for some concessions from the United States, “the EU should agree to move further on reform of the WTO dispute settlement procedure and a joint US-EU effort on state aid.”[32]

The Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act proposals by the European Commission will likely further strain trade differences as well. The packages, if or when passed, will effectively limit the ability of American tech giants – most likely Amazon, Google, Apple, and Facebook – to operate in Europe. Meredith Broadbent, writing for the CSIS, anticipates concern from the American side, stating that “not only are U.S. companies being marked for stricter regulation, but they are also being restrained while Chinese companies…will apparently be free to pursue their business objectives in Europe.”[33] Increased regulations will be detrimental to American startups and advantageous to European startups. This edge could be interpreted as protectionism or discrimination by American policymakers. And while there have been more attempts within the United States to increase regulation of tech giants, the attempts to do so by a foreign actor – such as the European Union – will likely be seen less favorably by American lawmakers. The focus of the United States and European Union must now be on trade cooperation, a willingness to make concessions, and creative thinking to circumvent issues compounded by external actors.

In this vein, Hegedüs notes that differences in trade policy, including the negative American trade balance, will be difficult to work through.[34] Kempe’s remedy via his Global Charter proposal depends on institutional linkage increasing forum spaces between democratic members.[35] Hegedüs offers more: the United States can offset some of these trade difficulties by investing more in the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund and in the energy and IT sectors of Central and Eastern Europe.[36] By comparison, the more policy-focused Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund is a strong example of how Biden could work around the leverage predicament, mentioned above, in which the United States now finds itself. The Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund is meant to fund a host of upgrades to energy, digital, and transport infrastructures in the region between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas.[37] Making the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund a greater priority in a new transatlantic partnership would also go a long way in increasing the transatlantic orientation and engagement of countries.

In summary, however, prioritization of the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund would theoretically cut out the need for Central and Eastern European countries to look to the east and accept Russian or Chinese investments into local infrastructure and influence into local politics. By increasing the amount of American dollars going into the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, the United States could limit Russian and Chinese capacities for soft power in local infrastructures and politics. This investment would heighten the American profile in this part of Europe and enable Three Seas member countries to be better equipped in the long run to stand on their own. If political, economic, and security needs could be met in the short-term by democratic, like-minded partners, and if Three Seas member countries could in the long-term become self-reliant, enough to meet many of their own needs, then predatory powers would find less of a market for their offerings and less of a foothold for their attempts at external influence.

Climate and Health

Climate change and the overall environment, along with the COVID-19 pandemic and overall health issues, are also constant themes throughout many of these proposals. Nonetheless, Biden pledged his commitment to these common causes – among others, rejoining the Paris Agreement and remaining in the World Health Organization. And in the spirit of transatlantic unity, Europe has been gladly receptive.[38] Consequently, these issues are not analyzed because of the general degree of consensus about these threats and their adequate global responses. But, one new initiative stands out. The Atlantic Club’s “Health Shield Europe” calls for the development of “synchronized protocols for prevention and reaction to epidemics and other civil emergency scenarios” between the European Union and NATO. This proposal also recommends that under certain scenarios, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, NATO be requested to “include epidemic threat[s] higher on its security agenda and in this concrete moment invoke Article 5.”[39] Clearly, global challenges will require global solutions, and working through large institutions to attain them will leave members freer to deal with the issues they face in their immediate regions.

Regional Challenges: China, Russia, and the Western Balkans

China and Russia are the most threatening actors to either the United States or Europe, and the risks they pose are both diverse and unique.


China poses an issue of soft power. Attempts to expand the Belt and Road Initiative throughout Central Asia and into Europe, develop 5G networks throughout Europe, and increase foreign direct investments into small Central and Eastern European countries make up the bulk of China’s soft power strategy. Hegedüs foresees containment of China tying up much of the Biden administration’s attention and time, arguing heavy and intelligent investments in Central and Eastern Europe give the United States its best chance of success at containing Chinese influence in the region.[40] And as detailed above, the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund provides one of the best and most structured opportunities for the United States to counter the threat of China.

In tandem, a successful execution of Johnson’s D-10 proposal, or another like it, would provide greater opportunities and fora for consultation and dialogue. Member democracies could more transparently and comprehensively coordinate agendas and policies. This recommendation is more global and institutional-based vis-à-vis Hegedüs’ more limited policy suggestions, rooted in what the United States can do for Europe. Furthermore, Erik Brattberg and Ben Judah argue that Johnson’s D-10 is not an anti-China group, but rather a narrowly mandated defensive alliance of 5G and critical supply chain strategies, thus making it easier to kickstart.[41] Meanwhile, the European Commission recommends launching a Transatlantic AI Agreement, to standardize values and norms surrounding AI; and an EU-US Trade and Technology Council, to expand opportunities for collaboration, leadership, and trade and investment.[42] Acting on this particular policy recommendation and pursuing this degree of alignment and integration, with members who are committed to discourse and collaboration, would go a long way towards shoring up multilateralism’s prospects of survival and success in a post-Trump world.


As for Russia, it poses an economic and military threat for Eastern Europe, and an economic threat for Western Europe. The United States has historically handled the on-the-ground realities of selling arms, training security forces, and sharing intelligence with its partners in Eastern Europe – such as Poland and the Baltic States.[43] Were the European Union to launch an Eastern Partnership Security Compact, as the ECFR suggests, it could align its “funds and institutions with the capabilities of member states that are willing to boost security cooperation in eastern Europe.” This proposal could take the form of greater cooperation in information sharing, which is also a key part of confidence-building; more robust capacity-building support for Eastern European intelligence agencies; increasing interaction in the areas of defense training, education, and planning; and assisting the de-Sovietization and upgrading of military hardware in the east. This last point could be especially salient for those EU members who have already put themselves through such changes. And inspiration could be taken from parallel de-Sovietization measures, that which the European Union is already engaging in with countries like Ukraine and its energy infrastructures.[44]

In “NATO 2030,” NATO reiterated its commitment to upgrading stable, dialogue-based, confidence-building measures, while continuing to pursue conventional military deterrence when meeting Russian aggression and violation of international rules.[45] Reversing Trump’s withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty will also be one of the strongest steps the Biden administration could take to recover ground lost by the United States within transatlantic measures intended to stabilize and normalize relations between itself and Russia. Recommendations on this topic from the European Leadership Network float the idea of “exploring possible limitations on NATO and Russian conventional force deployments in Europe.”[46] Such considerations may align with common projections that future conflicts will take place in cyberspace. In fact, cyber security will, in many instances, supersede conventional security.

The United States and virtually all NATO members and partners throughout Europe have suffered significant cyberattacks by Russia for years. Yet responses to destructive cyberattacks remain relatively mild, because, as Melissa Hathaway, with the Centre for International Governance Innovation, argues, the continuing uncertainty of how to respond to state-sponsored cyberattacks is detrimental to international stability and cybersecurity.[47] This threat is an area NATO has sought to shore up and upgrade, and proponents of deepening transatlantic ties one way or another will do well to make cybersecurity a tenet of their efforts. In fact, in July 2016 NATO reaffirmed that serious cyberattacks are capable of triggering Article 5. And at the Brussels Summit in 2018, the establishment of a Cyberspace Operations Centre strengthened NATO’s Command Structure with the agreement “that NATO can draw on national cyber capabilities for its missions and operations.”[48] Furthermore, “NATO 2030” reaffirms the organization’s commitment to supporting and developing the abilities of Allies to detect and combat cyberattacks; recommends that Article 4 be much more utilized when Allies suffer a cyberattack, “as a basis for political dialogue and signalling [sic] unity;” and declares the need for a “legal and ethical framework to be able to effectively and legitimately operate” in cyberspheres, but does not specifically lay out further guidelines for such frameworks.[49] Such guidelines can likely be expected to come in the near future, and their arrival would help fill the gap in cybersecurity identified by Hathaway.

The Western Balkans

Finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina represent a microcosm of what can be achieved with a successful revival of transatlantic cooperation. The Wilson Center’s proposal for overhauling the Dayton Accords lays out a ten-point framework for how the United States and European Union can join forces and constructively support Bosnia and Herzegovina – as well as the broader Western Balkans region. The framework’s points include enforcing obligatory reforms mandated by the European Convention on Human Rights and reaffirming Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity. The possibility of accession – either to NATO or the EU, or both – should be transparent enough to counter the otherwise “weak” conditionality built into the European Union’s current Economic and Investment Plan. This Economic and Investment Plan provides at least nine billion euros (and up to five billion more) to the region – the bulk of that sum, however, is directed towards the public sector, “precisely the parts of the economy that are captured by kleptocratic, ethno-nationalist elites.”[50]

The Wilson Center suggests the European Union shift to a smarter, more targeted investment system. Such a system could be highly effective when paired with the framework’s other proposals. Case in point: the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation’s Belgrade office playing a greater role in building regional infrastructure. Or, the European Union and United States working together to crack down on corrupt officials via sanctions. Enhancing the strategy and operability of the European Union Force (EUFOR), or supplanting it with a NATO-led force that could draw upon the United States’ considerable military funds, technology and forces, would backstop obstructionist efforts in the political and economic sectors and provide key security for Bosnian civil society. As the Dayton Center writes: “Bosnia’s implosion risks renewed bloodshed, refugee flows, border changes, and widespread economic disruption that could strengthen Russian and Chinese influence in the broader region, further fray the NATO alliance, and disrupt U.S. ties with the European Union.” Transatlantic cooperation for reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a unique opportunity, similar to the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, for American and European actors to “engage together as partners…[and]…enhance the other’s strengths.”[51]

Conclusion – A Challenging Cooperation Awaits

The primary topics analyzed in this piece center around different realities for each of the parties involved. These realities will complicate what Biden describes as “ambitious goals, and none of them can be reached without the United States – flanked by fellow democracies – leading the way.”[52] In sum, the transatlantic community will need to overcome the undermining efforts of authoritarian leaders while protecting and promoting democracy within its own ranks. Security needs differ across regions, and a suitable new division of labor needs to be forged between the United States and European Union. And divisiveness in trade between the United States, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe can be overcome with concentrated collaboration on issues that are already not far from resolution. Yet the assumption in Washington seems to be that, though transatlantic relations were paused in a way for the last four years, the incoming administration will be able to pick back up where it left off. This is a mistaken assumption, and many policy proposals have sought to correct that assumption, whether from a place of caution or one of assertion. The way forward will be determined by President Biden’s ability to listen to his partners, Europe’s ability to pull its own weight, and whether multilateralism can ultimately carry the day.


[1] Angela Merkel, quoted in “Angela Merkel: Europe must take ‘our fate’ into own hands,” Politico, May 28, 2017,

[2] David M. Herszenhorn, “Worried by Trump, G7 sees a bright side: he showed up,” Politico, May 27, 2017,

[3] Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2020,

[4] Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, “Europe still needs America: No matter who is in the White House, we are in this together,” Politico, November 2, 2020,

[5] Mariusz Błaszczak, “Europe’s alliance with the US is the foundation of its security: Poland’s defense minister on why there is no alternative to NATO,” Politico, November 25, 2020,

[6] Wilson Center, “Fixing Dayton: A New Deal for Bosnia and Herzegovina,” NextEurope No. 1, November 2020,

[7] Pierre Morcos, “‘Let’s Get to Work’: Restarting the Transatlantic Partnership,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 24, 2020,

[8] Daniel Hegedüs, “Why Central and Eastern Europe Will Matter for the Biden Administration,” German Marshall Fund, November 23, 2020,

[9] European Commission, “JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL: A new EU-US agenda for global change,” December 2, 2020,

[10] Jean-Yves Le Drian and Heiko Maas, “French and German foreign ministers: Joe Biden can make transatlantic unity possible,” The Washington Post, November 16, 2020,

[11] Julien Barnes-Dacey, Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, Ellie Geranmayeh, Mark Leonard, Theodore Murphy, Janka Oertel, Nicu Popescu, and Tara Varma, “A new transatlantic bargain: An action plan for transformation, not restoration,” European Council on Foreign Relations, November 26, 2020,

[12] Frederick Kempe, “Biden’s rare shot at a transformative presidency runs through Europe and China,” Atlantic Council, December 6, 2020,

[13] Coalition for a World Security Community of Democratic Nations,

[14] Alliance of Democracies,

[15] Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again.”

[16] ECFR, “A new transatlantic bargain: An action plan for transformation, not restoration.”

[17] Ishaan Tharoor, “An emerging new alliance of democracies,” The Washington Post, December 18, 2020,

[18] Hegedüs, “Why Central and Eastern Europe Will Matter for the Biden Administration.”

[19] Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “For the record, Denmark is only at 1.35% of GDP for NATO spending. They are a wealthy country and should be at 2%. We protect Europe and yet, only 8 of the 28 NATO countries are at the 2% mark. The United States is at a much, much higher level than that....,” Twitter, August 21, 2019,

[20] European Commission, “A new EU-US agenda for global change.”

[21] ECFR, “A new transatlantic bargain: An action plan for transformation, not restoration.”

[22] Gustav Gressel and Nicu Popescu, “The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its eastern neighbors,” European Council on Foreign Relations, November 3, 2020,

[23] Hegedüs, “Why Central and Eastern Europe Will Matter for the Biden Administration.”

[24] Morcos, “‘Let’s Get to Work’: Restarting the Transatlantic Partnership.”

[25] Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again.”


[27] Rosa Brooks, “The dangers of devaluing diplomacy and overvaluing the military,” The Washington Post, May 18, 2018,; Brett Bruen, “America’s diplomatic corps is being depleted under Trump, and that could cause serious problems for US foreign policy,” Business Insider, February 18, 2020,; and Carol Morello, “Trump administration again proposes slashing foreign aid,” The Washington Post, February 10, 2020,

[28] Błaszczak, “Europe’s alliance with the US is the foundation of its security;” and Kramp-Karrenbauer, “Europe still needs America.”

[29] The Associated Press, “Polish Leader Signs Deal Enhancing US Military Presence,”, November 9, 2020,; and Piotr Buras, “Biden’s Victory: The Consequences for Poland,” Balkan Insight, November 16, 2020,

[30] Loveday Morris and Michael Birnbaum, “Europe’s ‘rule of law’ standoff with Poland and Hungary becomes test over defining values,” The Washington Post, December 9, 2020,; and Rachel Savage, “EU urged to ratchet up pressure on Poland in defence of LGBT+ rights,” Reuters, August 3, 2020,

[31] Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again.”

[32] ECFR, “A new transatlantic bargain: An action plan for transformation, not restoration.”

[33] Meredith Broadbent, “The Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, and the New Competition Tool,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 10, 2020,

[34] Hegedüs, “Why Central and Eastern Europe Will Matter for the Biden Administration.”

[35] Kempe, “Biden’s rare shot at a transformative presidency runs through Europe and China.”

[36] Hegedüs, “Why Central and Eastern Europe Will Matter for the Biden Administration.”

[37] Three Seas,

[38] Frank Jordans and Jeff Schaeffer, “As leaders set fresh climate goals, Biden pledges US support,” The Associated Press, December 12, 2020,; and Stephanie Nebehay and Emma Farge, “WHO chief looks forward to working ‘very closely’ with Biden team,” Reuters, November 9, 2020,

[39] The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, “Health Shield Europe (#HeShEu): Open Letter to the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen,” April 7, 2020,

[40] Laurens Cerulus, “Europe’s 5G plans in limbo after latest salvo against Huawei: Attack on global chip supply chain jeopardizes Europe’s contracts,” Politico, August 25, 2020,; and Hegedüs, “Why Central and Eastern Europe Will Matter for the Biden Administration.”

[41] Erik Brattberg and Ben Judah, “Forget the G-7, Build the D-10,” Foreign Policy, June 10, 2020,

[42] European Commission, “A new EU-US agenda for global change.”

[43] Alexandra Brzozowski, “Amid beefed up security cooperation, Poland inks contract for US-made F-35 fighter jets,” EURACTIV, February 3, 2020,; Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Security Cooperation With the Baltic States,” June 11, 2020,; Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Security Cooperation With Poland,” December 19, 2019,; and Gressel and Popescu, “The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its eastern neighbors.”

[44] Gressel and Popescu, “The best defence: Why the EU should forge security compacts with its eastern neighbors.”

[46] European Leadership Network, “Recommendations from an experts’ dialogue: De-escalating NATO-Russia military risks,” December 6, 2020,

[47] Melissa Hathaway, “Getting beyond Norms: When Violating the Agreement Becomes Customary Practice,” Centre for International Governance Innovation, CIGI Papers No. 127 – April 2017,

[48] NATO, “Cyber defence,” September 25, 2020,

[49] NATO, “NATO 2030.”

[50] Wilson Center, “Fixing Dayton.”

[51] Wilson Center, “Fixing Dayton.”

[52] Biden, “Why America Must Lead Again.”


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