

# FREEDOM & UNION

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## The Future of the World's Democratic Core

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## Contents

Transatlantic Merger as the Ultimate Implication of Technological Imperatives _____	4
<i>Richard Rosecrance</i>	
The Future of the G-8: Irrelevance or a Core for Global Progress? _____	7
<i>Mitch Yoshida</i>	
The Democratic Peace _____	11
<i>James Huntley</i>	
Union of the West Endgame: A Straw Man Constitutional Amendment _____	20
<i>Richard Conn Henry</i>	
The Road to a Transatlantic Community _____	24
<i>David G. Wagner</i>	

# Transatlantic Merger as the Ultimate Implication of Technological Imperatives<sup>1</sup>

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Are we ready for an Atlantic Union? One way of approaching this question is to examine stages in the development of the international economy and the international polity.

Can we jump suddenly from 194 separate states to a united world government? We have tried that before and it led to thin degrees of coordination, thin degrees of commonality, and thin tariff negotiations. As we know, in trade the Doha round has failed and we have not succeeded in providing a single currency for the world. This leads us to believe that world unification is too great a jump.

The notion that we will somehow leap from the present 194-separate-sovereignty universe, to one in which all are united as one is, I think, naïve in the extreme. Therefore, what solution lies between 194 separate sovereignties and the unification of the world? Clarence Streit would have been happy to have the unification of the world if he could, but he recognized that was not going to take place right away.

## The Imbalances Problem

Today, countries suffering a trade imbalance cannot stimulate their economies indefinitely through deficit spending to sustain demand. Sooner or later international willingness to absorb government paper and liabilities will reach a limit. That limit applies particularly to the US government. When this point is reached, international economics must be re-balanced in some measure, with far stronger interna-

tional balances as a counterpart of smaller domestic deficits. This is arguably inevitable. When a re-balancing takes place, surplus countries, including China, must spend, consume, and inflate their economies in order for there to be balance in the international realm. It is exactly what John Maynard Keynes worried about in the scarce currency clause of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944. The United States would not, he feared, act as a responsible creditor power and hence had to be, in the short term, discriminated against under the scarce currency clause until it increased demand for overseas products.

Today, not only China, but also Japan and Germany consume too little, invest too much, and have artificially depreciated their currencies. The RMB is far undervalued. These policies, though pursued nationally, throw the burden of adjustment onto deficit countries which cannot sustain them. The United States and Britain cannot continue accumulating international and domestic debt. If they do, as Martin Wolf of *The Financial Times* has pointed out, they may go broke. When they finally fail to buy more goods from abroad, they will bring the rest of the world down with them.

How do we adjust the situation? In an ideal world, we would have free trade, currencies would freely fluctuate, capital would be fully mobile, and there would be no problem of adjustment. We are not, however, in such a world, and we will not be in it for a very long time.

## US-EU Customs Union as a Near-Term Softener for Imbalances

Under these circumstances, together with the failure of the Doha negotiations, what can deficit countries do? They can seek currency unions or preferential tariff zones in which to sell their goods so that the essentially mercantilist strategies of the surplus nations are submerged or vitiated to some degree within a free trade arrangement. This is exactly the proposal that John Williamson investigated in the 1980s. If one cannot dismantle mercantilism, then one avoids it by forming a customs union. Such a union would allow people to be inside the tariff barrier instead of facing mercantilism outside it.

The United States and Europe have a reason, at least on a short-term basis, to consider a broader customs union. Angela

Merkel's proposals of 2006 aimed at this objective. They were taken up, but only mildly, by the United States in the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) negotiations. A full free trade union, if consummated, would involve 50-60% of world GDP. The EU now has a GDP of \$16.2 trillion and the US \$14.4 trillion; together they constitute over \$30 trillion, equaling more than 52% of world GDP, which is currently around \$58 trillion.<sup>2</sup>

There are many other reasons to think that these two powers have the ability to unify, and ought to. As a proportion of Internet users, the US and the EU now account for 30% of the world.<sup>3</sup> Comparatively, more than 50% of all migrants attempt to enter the US and EU, implying that these are successful places of opportunity.<sup>4</sup> In terms of research and development expenditure and graduate education, the US and Europe are investing the most.<sup>5</sup>

### A Union Big Enough to Attract

One of the key aspects of this process toward union - and this is where I would agree with those who

emphasize global changes and the growth of other areas of the world - is that an economic union of the US and Europe would not be exclusive. It would draw the rest of the world in much more effectively than WTO negotiations. Japan, for example, could not manage to only export to its major markets and remain isolated from a Trans-Atlantic FTA (or TAFTA) arrangement for very long. And if Japan joins, China cannot be far behind.


The key method here is instead of trying to get 194 countries to agree to unify, we start out with building blocks that grow as trading partners are added progressively to the unit. The coexistence of blocs is an incredibly important phenomenon in world history. If we look at European history after the 1500s as a microcosm of world history, the balance of power has always been regarded as the vital

mechanism of order. In contrast, this new unification would be a world in which power, instead of repelling, would begin to attract.

This argument takes on additional force when you consider the corporations which already constitute a world of their own. Increasingly, there are economies of scale for industry, as indicated by the findings of the Complexity Institute at Santa Fe, which focuses on economies of scale. According to W. Brian Arthur and many others from that

institute, industries like civil aircraft, autos, software, finance, insurance, and even conventional arms are largely in two, three, or four places in the world. There is a diminishing number of firms. How many auto companies today can be efficient in the long-term? Even on the global market, are we talking about ten companies or only five? Not too long ago, back in the 1900s, there were 200 auto companies worldwide.

To deal with industrial concentration, states also have to be more concentrated. The world market is much larger than the largest state, and in order to get a grip on that market the state has to become greater.



An EU/US customs union would include over 52% of the world's GDP.

Clarence Streit wrote, “Politics can be separated from the machine no more than can civilization. The machine’s nature is such that to use it or to make the most of it, men need more of the world than they needed before its invention.”<sup>6</sup> His insight is still true today. To do the work well, and exist with an increasing number of cheap machines today, one needs the whole planet. We will not get to that in one sudden move. We will get it only in bites.

The logical first step is for the US and Europe to unite, but such a consolidation will not rule out others. Nor should it be limited to arrangements of democracy alone because sooner or later China and Russia will have to find some place in it. I think that a proposal for a TAFTA has to be presented in terms much more substantial than that of the TEC.

### **Union Would Avert the Risk of Conflict with a Rising China**

The United States cannot respond to the growth of China on its own. It cannot match China in terms of vertical economic growth. We know that major conflicts have occurred when two great powers have intersected on the curve of power. When Germany passed Britain, when Russia and Germany were nearing equality - those were the periods in which conflict occurred. We have to worry about that in relation to China. How can the United States keep up with China, at least using short-term expedients? Chinese GDP, as we know, doubles every 8 years. US GDP doubles every 24 years. Unless the US merges with another great continental economy, it will not keep up. Horizontal geopolitical growth is the effective response to the Chinese vertical challenge.

Left alone, 300 million Americans cannot possibly stay ahead of 1.3 billion Chinese, which will give rise to sharp tensions. But a union of 800 million Americans and Europeans, or 1.1 billion if Japan and other OECD countries join, will make it very difficult for China to catch up in any meaningful time frame. China accounts for 8% of world GDP; the OECD accounts for 74%.<sup>7</sup> It could only catch up if it reached the same level of income per

capita, and that will take a long time. By then China might have become a part of the Union. And the Union would have meanwhile grown larger by expanding elsewhere. In this sense, too, the Union would provide a helpful stabilization in world affairs.

This Union will require a major change in American strategy. President Obama has arguably been against much of this. Perhaps he is influenced by the literature on Western decline, which has raised the same question. But he has framed it only as a question of separate nation-states. This leads to self-defeating answers, such as devaluing the old organic bonds with Europe in the name of the new bonds with emerging powers. But remember, when Bill Clinton came into the presidency, he was opposed to NAFTA and not very friendly to NATO. He rapidly changed his position. Obama can do the same as slowed economic growth makes a US customs union with Europe both possible and imperative. Without it, neither Europe nor the United States will emerge quickly from their current economic malaise. □

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### NOTES

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# The Future of the G-8

## Irrelevance or a Core for Global Progress?

Mitch Yoshida

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In the year following the G-8's decision to cede its leading role in multilateral economic policy coordination to the G-20, many have praised the move as a step toward improving the world's ability to address global economic challenges. In outlining the rationale for the shift, the Obama administration asserted that "dramatic changes in the world economy have not always been reflected in the global architecture for economic cooperation" and that the G-20 would be better-suited to "meet the needs of an interconnected global economy."<sup>1</sup> French President Nicolas Sarkozy, moreover, argued that an expansion to include emerging economies was not just a "matter of fairness," but a prerequisite for "being able to act effectively."<sup>2</sup>

Although the G-8 continues to coordinate policies related to international security and development, some question whether the forum even has a future. Bruce Jones at the Brookings Institution has argued that the G-8's "claim for primacy in development is nonsensical and the claim for continued primacy in peace and security is defensible but shortsighted."<sup>3</sup> The only reason the G-8 still exists, he argues, is that it is a smaller forum in which the US can "fight the Europeans" privately.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, officials from G-8 member states and other countries expect that the G-20 will gradually assume the G-8's broader portfolio.<sup>5</sup>

But condemning the G-8 to irrelevance would be out of choice, not necessity, and it would not represent a step toward more effective global governance. While the G-20 has demonstrated its utility in shaping a more inclusive international order and addressing specific global economic

issues, it has been unable to muster substantive agreement on the critical challenges of climate change and stalled international trade negotiations. Given the G-20's inability to take action on these challenges, the limited amount of time available to address them, and the dire consequences of failing to do so, the G-8 must utilize its comparative strength and function as a core for global progress on these issues.

### **The Comparative Strength and Limits of the G-8**

What exactly is the G-8's comparative strength vis-à-vis the G-20? Unlike the latter forum, whose members cooperate solely on the basis of shared interests highlighted by the recent global economic crisis, the G-8 possesses a far more cohesive membership. This is derived from the forum's very limited size and its cooperation on the basis of shared interests, values, and largely liberal democratic political systems. These commonalities have afforded the G-6/7/8 a level of cohesion that has enabled it to coordinate strategies to address the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the oil shocks of the 1970s, and subsequent global economic and security challenges.<sup>6</sup> In essence, the G-8 has emerged as a channel through which a small number of already close countries coordinate their respective policies to address global issues.

As new challenges emerged over the past decade, however, the G-8 increasingly encountered both real and self-imposed limitations. In attempting to address climate change and stalled international trade negotiations, the G-8 explicitly confined itself

to supporting broader multilateral efforts under the United Nations and the WTO.<sup>7</sup> In contrast, it faced real limits in the wake of the recent financial crisis. The need for a new global financial regulatory framework clearly exceeded its scope as anything short of a global agreement would lead banks and other financial institutions to shift to countries with the most lax regulation.<sup>8</sup> The G-8 was also unable to effectively address widening global economic imbalances, a major source of which is China's undervalued currency.<sup>9</sup>

### **The Comparative Strength and Limits of the G-20**

In order to overcome these real and self-imposed limitations, the G-8 ceded its role as the principal forum for policy coordination on global economic issues to the G-20 in September 2009. As a forum that includes not only the developed G-8, but also key emerging economies, it was correctly predicted that the G-20 would possess a comparative advantage in addressing two of the aforementioned challenges. In an effort to prevent or at least mitigate the effects of another global financial crisis, its members recently agreed to adopt financial regulations that will enhance bank capital and liquidity. The Bank of International Settlements' Basel Committee, which the G-20 tasked with formulating the new regulations by its next meeting in November, has already facilitated agreement on the principles and standards underpinning this new framework.<sup>10,11</sup>

The G-20 has also facilitated modest progress on remedying the global economic imbalances caused by an undervalued Chinese yuan, which is a major contributor to trade deficits in the developed world.<sup>12</sup> Although the Chinese government denies that the G-20's collective pressure played any role in its decision to allow the yuan to appreciate, the fact that it authorized the change just prior to the G-20's meeting in Toronto – the first in over two years – suggests it did.<sup>13</sup> In light of numerous analyses indicating that the yuan remains undervalued, however, it remains to be seen if China continues to cooperate in the effort to create a more balanced and sustainable global economy.

In contrast, the G-20 has proven limited in its ability to address climate change. Despite projections of increased emissions in the future and

the catastrophic impact this will have on economic growth, agricultural production, political stability, and international security, the G-20's Toronto summit communiqué only committed members to "negotiations under the UNFCCC on the basis of its objective provisions and principles including common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" and an "inclusive process" at the UNFCCC's upcoming Cancun Conference.<sup>14,15</sup> This fails to resolve the key questions of how to finance greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions and phase out fossil fuel subsidies. As Kim Carstensen, the head of the World Wildlife Fund's Global Climate Initiative, stated: "They haven't really produced anything that is relevant in terms of active progress."<sup>16</sup>

The G-20 has also failed to produce a substantive agreement on how to achieve an urgently needed expansion in international trade that would hasten global economic recovery, counteract protectionist forces, and promote growth. Pascal Lamy, the Director-General of the WTO, recently recognized that expanded trade would act as a "stimulus package to the world economy... that does not need to be financed out of national treasuries."<sup>17</sup> While heartened by the fact that protectionism only played a limited role during the global recession, he warned that the danger of additional protectionist measures still exists due to persistently high unemployment rates.<sup>18</sup> Despite the urgent need to avert these forces, which could derail a fragile global recovery and slow growth, the G-20 has only gone as far as expressing its "support for bringing the WTO Doha Development Round to a balanced and ambitious conclusion as soon as possible."<sup>19</sup> Given the size and diversity of the G-20, which includes the US, China, and India – the main parties responsible for the impasse in Doha Round – its inability to produce a substantive agreement on this issue is unsurprising.

### **Leverage the G-8 for Global Action on Climate Change**

In the context of the G-20's shortcomings, and the catastrophic consequences that will ensue if those shortcomings are not addressed, the G-8 urgently needs to leverage its cohesion to take action beyond previously self-imposed limits. It can begin to address climate change by following through on its

recent agreement to cut emissions in the developed world 80% by 2050 by adopting the European Commission's proposal for an OECD-wide carbon market.<sup>20,21</sup> If accompanied by a common external tariff on GHG-intensive goods that conforms to WTO rules, as French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi recently proposed for the EU, such a system would impose costs on GHG emitters within the area and GHG-intensive goods imported into the area.<sup>22</sup> This would reduce emissions within the OECD area, which accounts for approximately half of the global total, and create a strong incentive for external emitters that rely on access to OECD markets to shift away from GHG-intensive production.<sup>23</sup>

Since OECD members share the aforementioned characteristics that make the G-8 so cohesive, and many already operate under the EU's Emission Trading System (ETS), such a step would hardly be a stretch of the imagination. In the wake of the US Senate's failure to consider a bill that would have created a carbon trading system, political support for this effort could be drawn from the determination of many US states to pursue their own measures and OECD members already under the EU's ETS.<sup>24</sup>

### Leverage the G-8 to Expand International Trade

The G-8 can also leverage its cohesion to expand international trade by following through on its recent statement of support for "bilateral and regional trade negotiations."<sup>25</sup> It could do this by providing the impetus for the creation of an OECD-wide trade agreement that would provide a level of economic stimulus far beyond bilateral


arrangements without the need for deficit spending, keep protectionist tendencies in check, and promote economic growth.<sup>26</sup> In doing so, the OECD could extend these benefits to the broader world as

improving economic growth within a developed area that accounts for 74% of world GDP would increase its members' leverage in the WTO's stalled Doha Round of international trade negotiations and push it toward a conclusion.<sup>27</sup> As German Chancellor Angela Merkel argued in 2006 in reference to a similarly-sized Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA), such an entity could function as "a tool" to encourage trade globally.<sup>28</sup>

### The Future of the G-8: Irrelevance or a Core for Global Progress?

With the serious consequences of climate change and stalled international trade negotiations on the horizon, G-8 policymakers have a choice: to condemn the G-8 to irrelevance and possibly fail to address these challenges or to utilize the forum's comparative strength and act as a core for global progress on these issues. By drawing on its cohesion, which is derived from a limited membership and broad commonalities, the G-8 can act beyond its previously self-imposed limitations to generate momentum for the creation of an OECD-wide regional trade agreement and carbon

market. These steps would reduce GHG emissions, ensure a sustained global economic recovery, keep protectionist tendencies in check, and boost global economic growth into the future. While the more inclusive G-20 has clearly demonstrated its worth in facilitating broader action on the key issues of global banking reform and imbalances, its lack of cohesion has prevented it from producing substantive agreements on these pressing challenges. □



... **improving economic growth within a developed area that accounts for 74% of world GDP would increase its members' leverage in the WTO's stalled Doha Round of international trade negotiations and push it toward a conclusion.**

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NOTES

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# The Democratic Peace

James R. Huntley

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The United States and, indeed, the free world, today finds itself at a historic crossroads. Multiple world crises have prompted some to turn to short-term measures grounded in 17<sup>th</sup> century *realpolitik*. However, the United States, still the “default” global power, must boldly set forth a new *long-term* strategy to address these increasingly globalized demands and conflicts. New systems of cooperation and integration, prefigured by Euro-Atlantic developments since 1945 and embodied today by such models as the European Union, NATO, the OECD, and companion organizations, should be developed and greatly strengthened. Planning should begin to prepare a world system based principally on democratic community building among likeminded nations and peoples, independent of hegemon or balance-of-power politics. This paper proposes a supplementary path for current foreign policy to be implemented jointly by the United States and its key allies. The new path will re-integrate, update, and extend a more than sixty-year effort based on the twin principles of Democracy and Community – the essential building blocks of a greatly enhanced, integrated, and effective world system. Our goal must be to undergird and gradually democratize the world system itself, to encourage the creation of a very substantial majority of stable democratic states, and thus render war-making virtually and universally impossible.

## The Democratic Peace: A Background

The world has been wedded to the European system of international relations bequeathed to it by the

Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648. It is a system rooted in the idea of nation-state sovereignty, based on the two principles of territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures. Important changes have altered this system over the centuries – the rise of nationalism; the requirements wrought by the forces of science, technology, industrialization, and globalization; and the overriding need for a new political order after two world wars. It is remarkable that this system, although modified and perpetually embroiled in controversy, endures today in its essentials and remains the rulebook for the whole world

Surprisingly, the United States has been the principal modern instigator of change in what is now a “Westphalia-plus” system since the European system broke down in 1919 and 1945. Now, in 2010, it is clear that the United States has stumbled seriously. After pioneering substantial and progressive changes in international conduct and the fundamentals of the entire underlying interstate system, the US has once more backed away from accepting the implications of the revised “set of rules” which was the product of its own patient leadership. Ironically, it was Woodrow Wilson who, with “world” public opinion overwhelmingly (if ephemerally) behind him, insisted that the Great Powers create the League of Nations. Yet Wilson’s own nation, when confronted with a treaty that would have committed it to joining other nations in making war on any aggressor, refused to participate.

After leading in the creation of the United Na-

tions, the Bretton Woods international economic organizations, and the panoply of specialized UN affiliates to deal with world health, nuclear energy, economic and social development, human rights, and more, the United States fully embraced its new world regime. Then, in 1947, when faced with a new mortal threat to Western civilization in the form of a massive Soviet challenge, the US felt compelled to lead the response. NATO, the European Union, and a number of related groupings were created and not only endured but grew in scope and importance over the next half century.

The advent of these institutions constituted an amazing and unprecedented new episode in history. On the heels of such success and the end of the Cold War, I and many others wonder how the United States could refuse to join the new world criminal court and prove unwilling to join the Kyoto Agreement to curb climate change. This set the stage for a 180-degree change in policy when Islamic terrorists slammed into the New York Trade Towers on 9/11. The new Bush administration turned its back on the world system that the United States and its friends had created, to wage virtually unilateral preventive war in the Middle East. By 2008, the unprecedented world system that the United States had nurtured for more than 60 years was in tatters.

Now a new era in global affairs is upon us, marked by the presidency of Barack Obama and the urgency of a major worldwide economic recession. The situation calls for American leadership, even though a large number of world leaders and publics felt “burned” by US actions after 9/11. Can the United States now have, as Zbigniew Brzezinski recently put it, “a second chance” to help the world turn a decisive corner and fundamentally reform the system? Can we meet the world’s expectations? More importantly, can we meet the expectations we have for ourselves? Is our nation up to the task?

American world dominance, or what some call hegemony, which existed for a brief half century after the Second World War, can no longer be regarded as an adequate basis on which to build a new and urgently needed world system. There is, in other words, a leadership gap that needs to be filled. It is unfortunately true that whatever transpires will still

need US leadership, because no other single power or group of powers can conceivably replace us in the near future. While there are other candidates for “world leadership” such as China, India, Russia, the European Union, or some combination of these, none are ready or would likely gain acceptance for this role. The alternatives to US leadership, it would seem, are either a balance of power/*Realpolitik* system or anarchy.

The EU is the only power with which the United States could conceivably combine to fill this gap, although Japan, Canada, Australia, and possibly others could also participate. These two powerful forces in world affairs, both the product of the 18<sup>th</sup> century transatlantic Enlightenment, have come to dominate political thought and practice the world over. To be sure, there are other ways of looking at the affairs of nations, but

these two at present seem predominant. They stand on two “tectonic forces” or ideas that form the basis of world order: the growth of democracy, defined as a set of principles for sound self-government; and the expansion and deepening of international cooperation, or the “growing together” of some nations in order to fulfill critical tasks that none can do individually. These “tectonic forces,” in turn, are deeply influenced by other world trends, especially: (1) The increasing realization that modern democracies are less likely than non-democracies to make war on one another. This makes it easier to form cooperative international communities composed of democracies. (2) The advent of civil society, which has provided a new dimension for domestic and international politics all over the world, and has sometimes given rise to movements and undertakings that governments did not envisage. (3) The global burgeoning of communications, which is diminishing the importance of national borders, modifying the whole concept of national sovereignty. (4) The earth’s growing ecological and economic interdependence.

These trends, although occasionally colliding, are on the whole mutually supportive and have shaped the international system for some time. Before examining what aspects of the international system could be consciously re-designed, however, let us examine the two tectonic forces of democracy and international cooperation more closely.

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## The Growth of Democracy

The concepts for this new way of political life emerged during the 18<sup>th</sup> century transatlantic Enlightenment, embodied in Britain's "glorious revolution" and the American and French revolutions. After Napoleon, democratic progress was less dramatic, but the overall trend for 200 years has nevertheless been progressively upward. The 19<sup>th</sup> century witnessed a surge of support for the establishment of representative constitutional government, guaranteed civil rights, and the rule of law – all hallmarks of contemporary democracy. Although the roots of the modern democratic impulse are mainly found in the West, its momentum and staying power are almost universal. One recent example of this is the "split civic personality" shown in the Iranian elections in the summer of 2009.

By 1900, perhaps no more than half a dozen states could yet be called "democracies," even by the limited criteria of the day. A quarter century later, there were perhaps two to three dozen democratic states as some tyrannies and autocracies had crumbled in World War I and colonies demanded freedom. Much democratic backsliding occurred, however, during the Great Depression. In considerable measure, the Second World War was fought to decide whether democracy would have a second chance, or indeed endure at all. Fascist totalitarianism was soundly repudiated, at great cost in lives and treasure, but the Cold War once again shook the West to its roots.


The historical experience of over two centuries seems to show that the demand for a say in one's fate, plus a strong desire for fairness and human rights, have come to be near-universal social impulses and are found in all parts of the world. This is

not to say that democratic inclinations have not been modified or suppressed by cultural or religious patterns, despair, and sometimes sheer terror. While most democratic states are found in the West, democracy is not "natural" to or achievable only by Western peoples. Today, there are relatively democratic societies in all parts of the world. Most people, if they come to know that they have a choice, want freedom, the principal guarantor of which is constitutional democracy. Whether they attain it or not, is another matter.

## Growth in International Cooperation

Just as the story of modern democracy must begin at the close of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, so we must look to the same era for the origins of today's framework for cooperation among nations. When diplomatic relations were codified after the treaties of Westphalia, the signatories were trying to restore European order and avoid armed conflict after the disastrous Thirty Years War. Several philosophers and statesmen, especially Hugo Grotius, had begun to outline the principles of international law, laying foundations for the coming age of Enlightenment and beyond. Immanuel Kant presented a plan for "perpetual peace" based on his assertion that republics (democracies) would not make war with one another, and could therefore establish a universal rule of law within an international federation. This would replace the rule of national power in international affairs. Such schemes had been foreshadowed, at least in part, by Erasmus, the French monk Crucé, and the French monarch Henry IV.

After the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the Great Powers again determined that large-scale conflict must be avoided; this agreement was "legislated" internationally by the crowned heads of Prussia, Austria, Russia, England, and France, who formed a "Concert of Europe." Their foreign ministers met continually until the



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1870s as a kind of reactionary forerunner of the League of Nations and the UN. The Concert powers, acting in tandem, sought to keep the forces of reform and revolution in check. Their principal objective for much of the 19th century was to hold back successive democratic “waves,” but this meant trying to cope with the insistent new forces of nationalism, global commerce, science, technology, and industrialization. Almost as afterthoughts to its primary task of damping down wars and revolutions, the Concert of Europe dealt more successfully with a few practical, non-political problems. It created the Rhine River Commission, the first international institution with its own civil service. In the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> century a number of special-purpose organizations followed, institutionalizing international cooperation in such mundane fields as telegraphy and postal services. The first world court was followed by a number of treaties providing for international dispute arbitration. These were forerunners of a more modern system of international justice – the World Court, Interpol, and the International Criminal Court.

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, this rudimentary system of international cooperation, as well as a number of early attempts to spread democracy, began to break down. A series of European wars from 1853 on culminated in 1914’s carnage and a subsequent wholesale change in national borders and systems of government, involving most of the nations that had made up the Concert of Europe. Sobered after the Great War, the Allied powers, at President Woodrow Wilson’s urging, created a “League of Nations” to try to contain war and address some of its causes. The United Nations, virtually universal in membership, emerged as the League’s successor and continues to serve as the prime world body in the present era. The UN’s most important associated institutions are those set up in 1944 and after to manage the world economy: the World Bank; the International Monetary Fund; and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (which later became the World Trade Organization). Directly under today’s UN umbrella are programs dealing with such varied concerns as human rights, peacekeeping missions, and development programs. Still more UN affiliates cover pub-

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lic health, food and agriculture, children’s rights, refugees, education, and culture. The UN General Assembly is a forum representing all 192 members of the United Nations. It emits a lot of sound and fury, but also allows every regime, from the most repressive to the most democratic, to have a voice.

The UN “family” thus covers broad and diverse activities, which ultimately touch virtually every inhabitant of the planet in one way or another. There is much criticism of the United Nations, including charges of mismanagement and corruption within its international civil service. But reflection suggests that if this institution for managing world interdependence did not exist, we would have to create one. “Starting from scratch” is not an option, but reform is. But what sort of reform? In which direction? This paper

suggests that *democratic* reform is the way forward. But before delving into this, we must first examine the centerpiece of the UN system – the Security Council.

The most controversial UN organ is the Security Council, set up to deal with threats to world peace. It is the butt of countless criticisms, but it is the only body representing the security interests – if only weakly and indirectly in most cases – of all 192 UN Members. The Security Council has nonetheless been able to deal more or less effectively with many threats to peace by dispatching peacekeeping military forces, brokering ceasefires, and monitoring elections. Often accompanying such efforts are humanitarian missions sent by other organs of the UN, individual governments, and non-governmental organizations. And, incidentally, not negligible are UN-inspired efforts to set standards for observing human rights, through councils and commissions, alongside the activities of world or *ad hoc* judicial bodies. UN efforts to bring compliance, especially in war-crimes cases, are an important element in dealing with threats to peace even though the toughest cases often go unsettled, are frustrated, or are set aside for a later attempt.

The Security Council is also the organ which most often publicly displays the impotence of the United Nations. This is usually so in dire situations when one or the other Permanent Five members of

the UN Security Council vetoes action touching on its supposed “vital interests.” Failure to act has sometimes had disastrous consequences for human lives and nations; the UN incapacity in the face of the Rwandan massacres in the 1980s is a prime example. Sometimes, as in Somalia in 1993, an early effort to manage conflict is badly botched; the UN is blamed but continues to try to treat, with futility, one of the world’s open sores.

The United States is thus no stranger to 20<sup>th</sup> century attempts to organize international cooperation, which began with Teddy Roosevelt’s and Taft’s early efforts, was brought to a head by Wilson for a war-weary world in 1917-19, and resumed under American leadership from 1945 through the end of the Cold War. US encouragement of the new 1950s “community” processes in Europe (today embodied in the European Union) and complemented by a transatlantic security order underpinned by NATO, symbolized a new and different stage in international cooperation that in some cases involved the dramatic, unprecedented, and explicit merging of sovereignty.

With disturbing frequency since the 1990s, however, American leadership in community-building has languished and started to relapse increasingly into the traditional but dangerous approach of *Realpolitik*. Too often since 9/11, the United States has signaled, to both our public and our allies, a drift towards *Pax Americana*.

The imperial corollary was that the UN itself had become irrelevant, indeed harmful, to US interests and that our democratic and other partners were not needed for crucial international enterprises such as those in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. However, with a near collapse of the US position in Iraq in 2005, plus an election and some crucial leadership changes in the Bush cabinet, a belated White House effort began to alter course. To continue to salvage the interests of the “democratic community” seems to be a priority for the Obama administration.

At the same time that it discounted the value of

both the UN and multilateral systems of international collaboration, the Bush administration placed significant rhetorical emphasis on “promoting democracy.” Inadequate efforts to follow through in practice, however, placed the Bush administration’s commitment to this objective in question and raised serious worries in many minds. By 2008 the twin paths of international cooperation/community-building at all levels and intelligently promoting democracy abroad had thus been thoroughly downgraded in the public mind, both at home and abroad. In this new environment, the United States was in danger of losing its previous edge in “soft power.”

### **Putting Two and Two Together: Community and Democracy**

Thus laboriously, and sometimes on a most uncertain path, the world powers over two centuries (and more recently individuals working to create civil societies) have set up international machinery to collectively grapple with crises and on-going ailments in the international system.

Individual states’ efforts to deal with world security crises may still sometimes dramatically eclipse the impact of international teamwork in the short-run. But when some of the most powerful of the inner circle of “Great Powers” attempt to take security matters into their own hands (as France, Great Britain, and Israel did in Suez in 1956, the USSR did in Cuba in 1962, and the

US did in Iraq in 2003), the pressures of public opinion, other Great Powers, and the UN are brought to bear. Patience and international collaboration in most cases would have produced a better outcome.

Meanwhile, democracy continues to flourish in roughly half the world. Is the world ready to speed up this process? Can this be achieved not only by encouraging the capacity of peoples for self-government, but also by *combining* in pursuit of their common interests, their growing degree of like-mindedness, and their ability to act *jointly* in

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**This approach constitutes a blueprint for the next step forward: close cooperation among established democracies, which can form the basis for a durable system of international cooperation and even integration. Such an international system offers the best prospects for a lasting “democratic peace.”**

cases where national means are insufficient? Given the glaring imperfections of the international system, there is a growing gap in world management. Since 1946, the leading democratic nations have sought, often with success, to find a regional or multilateral approach that would fill this gap and serve the increasingly inseparable causes of democracy and their common interests. It is this approach to international relations, which entails joint efforts by likeminded democratic nations and peoples to address major crises parallel to and supportive of the UN complex, that we are concerned with here.

The chief model for this kind of international order is to be found in today's European Union, companion regional bodies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and ancillary institutions. G. John Ikenberry calls these arrangements "co-binding." The EU, in particular, embraces some supranational characteristics in courts and executives with "teeth" of their own, which facilitates the "growing together" of these nations. This approach constitutes a blueprint for the next step forward: close cooperation among established democracies, which can form the basis for a durable system of international cooperation and even integration. Such an international system offers the best prospects for a lasting "democratic" peace.

### **The Goal: A Democratic Peace**

In her recent book, *Day of Empire*, Amy Chua makes a profound contribution to understanding the community-building process, starting with world systems that were anything but democratic by today's standards. Chua has reviewed the trajectory of world powers, ancient and modern, from ascendancy to decline, and concluded that the "glue" that held them together was a "relative tolerance" defined "as ways to command the allegiance or at least the acquiescence of the foreign populations they dominated."<sup>1</sup> But empires were empires, and Chua confronts the growing contradictions within the "hyperpower" label – between old ideas of imperial rule and the rise of two examples of an entirely dif-

ferent sort of modern power with imperial reach but without imperial designs: (1) the United States; and (2) the rise of post-1945 Europe. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, American influence became preeminent around the world, culturally, economically, and to a great extent as a model for modern government. Following two disastrous world wars, the European powers

created, with American help, the substantial beginnings of a supranational community of nations embodied in what is now the European Union. Within the EU, there is a democratic peace; after nearly 400 years, war among the powers that wrote the Westphalian agreements has vanished.

Can either the United States or the EU, asks Chua, now serve as a dominant hyperpower that goes beyond empire and offers a democratic model for the world? While Chua does not answer this

question, if neither the US nor the EU can handle such a role by themselves, a combination of the two plus a dozen or so other established democracies (e.g., Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Chile) would be a viable candidate to establish the core of a Democratic Peace. But it would only constitute a core; the march of democracy would determine the community's future.

If the foregoing proposal seems like a potentially durable one, then two corollaries follow: (1) the advance of "democracy" can be correlated with the progress toward the organization of international cooperation, greatly enhancing the prospects for world peace; and (2) the successful management of cooperative systems within democratic states and "wannabes" and between them, depends on Chua's "glue." Domestically, the adhesive for each democratic political system will have to be developed case by case. Internationally, the chief ingredient in the glue to hold together nation-states in a Democratic Peace will have to be a shared belief among the constituent peoples in their common civic duty to practice and enable the principles of democracy to spread. These principles include tolerance, the capacity to work with other states to develop shared objectives, and the will to work with others to advance those common objectives.

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It should be noted that the founding charters of NATO, the Council of Europe, the European Union, and other constituent bodies of this new “system” all refer to the values of democracy as fundamental to their existence. NATO’s preamble, for example, states: “The Parties to this Treaty . . . are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” The United States has, implicitly and explicitly, espoused such international statements of principle at one time or another. While such proclamations are not new, what *would be* new is if all of these key democracies explicitly espoused the two aforementioned mutually reinforcing principles. They could offer them as a kit of “jointly owned and operated” diplomatic tools to guide their respective foreign policies. These could probably be understood and put into practice by likeminded nations if their leaders and publics understand what is at stake, and the considerable progress they have already made in developing a system of Democratic Peace.

While this prize is still a distant possibility, it is within sight.

The aim of this effort would be to undergird and gradually democratize the world system itself, encourage the creation of a majority of stable democratic states, and ultimately render war-making virtually impossible. After centuries of vacillation between war and peace, the only system for managing conflict that emerged was the balance of power. In light of this, it might be worth setting aside a relatively small amount of effort to build an alternative Democratic Peace. Given the unusual “time-out” for democratic community-building during the Cold War, we are closer to a working model than we may think. Many building blocks are already in place, as is an ever-clearer view of humanity’s ineluctable needs.

### **Building a Democratic World Community**

For more than half a century, the United States has followed a two-track approach to international relations. One is traditional and still predominant while the second is ground-breaking, still in its early stages, and not widely understood. Traditionally, nation-

al sovereignty has served as the basis for diplomacy among nations, and the balance of power has usually been the familiar, overriding consideration. Since World War II, however, a new approach has emphasized collaboration with democratic partners in new institutions, which we can term the “community” approach. Bilateral dealings and multipolar UN-centered diplomacy characterize the day-to-day conduct of US relations with most other nations. But with our key democratic allies, the United States has much closer and more effective ways of working. Through institutions such as NATO, the OECD, and the EU, member states draw on their “likemindedness” to advance cooperation. Only a few states in North America and Europe (plus Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) can be considered to be thoroughly likeminded.

Speaking at recent “G” meetings, President Obama has indicated a thorough understanding of the dilemmas and opportunities inherent in this approach. It is here proposed that the United States, as a principal aim of its foreign policy, exert its leadership strongly to deepen and extend the steady creation of *democratic community relationships*. With the cooperation of its high-capacity democracy (HCD) allies, it should:<sup>2</sup>

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**The aim of this effort would be to undergird and gradually democratize the world system itself... and ultimately render war-making virtually impossible.**

1. *Apply the foregoing democratic community development proposals.* Given the dire world economic situation, the processes of globalization, and the inadequacies of related world institutions, work toward this objective has already begun as indicated by the formation of the G-20 and the reform of the OECD. Updating UN economic institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, WTO, and the International Labor Organization is more challenging, as these “UN-family” organizations include many partly democratic or non-democratic nations.

2. *Undertake efforts to promote democracy worldwide.* Concentrate on nations that both seek help and need it, such as Turkey, Ukraine, Peru, Georgia, and Nigeria. Treat the strategic “hard nut” non-democracies (such as Belarus, Burma, North Korea, Cuba) patiently with progress measured on a much longer time-scale. Work especially hard to encour-

age democratic development within countries of paramount strategic importance, such as China and Russia. These potential “hypercpowers” will require tailor-made attention in both policy “tracks” for a long time to come. In making use of both modes, the leading democratic powers should aim for harmonious, or at least consistent, policies.

3. *Build regional community ties among democracies, with the European Union as a model, both to spread the values and practices of democracy and to inculcate habits of interstate cooperation.* India, for example, could be encouraged to lead in the development of a *South Asian Community of Democracies*, initially combining with the three weak but strategic “democratic wannabes” of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Later, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Singapore, and East Timor could be brought in. Australia and New Zealand could provide valuable help and counsel. This would strengthen regional security and possibly promote economic integration, modernization, and the development of dispute resolution mechanisms. With this framework for relations, in place, India and Pakistan move toward accommodation on the Kashmir question. Such a body could also positively affect the position of Iran in the larger region.

4. *Strengthen the substantial but little-noticed inter-governmental Community of Democracies (CD), both financially and technically.* Created in Warsaw in 2000, the CD is composed of more than 100 member-nations and has the support of a very active civil society network paralleling that of its member governments. A US NGO, the Council for a Community of Democracies provides the Secretariat for CD’s International Steering Committee. Begun at the initiative of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the Government of Poland, CD continued to receive modest and quiet encouragement from the Department of State under Secretaries Powell and Rice after 9/11. Biennial CD conferences and increasing numbers of subsidiary activities have been

undertaken; it has spawned a *Diplomat’s Handbook for Democracy Development Support* (used so far by more than a dozen ministries of foreign affairs); created an International Centre for Democratic Transition (Budapest); spurred a UN Democracy Caucus; successfully urged the UN to establish a \$100 million grant-making fund for the promotion of democracy; and supported the rapid growth of civil society worldwide as essential infrastructure for democratic development.

5. *Work to gradually infuse the institutions of world cooperation, especially the UN “family,” with democratic norms.* Despite years of reform efforts, the work of the UN Council (originally Commission) for Human Rights is a pale reflection of the funda-

mental values implied by its title. In addition, the various international courts must be assured of their independence and widening writ. Last, the UN Security Council’s membership should be adjusted to more accurately reflect the worldwide distribution of responsibility and power as well as the growing commitment of the world community to democracy.

6. *Develop a joint, continuous planning process to help democratic nations define international crisis points that require joint action, and steps they might take to address*

*these.* Behind-the-scenes inter-allied policy formation should be accompanied by the input of related legislative bodies. The activity, status, and scope of the *North Atlantic Assembly*, for example, which has benefited from the work of NATO and OECD parliamentarians since 1954, could be expanded considerably. The European Parliament should also be involved.

7. *Continue joint examination of the principles and practice of democracy within our own nations.* This would require broad public education programs plus “re-tooling” for diplomats, military leaders, civil servants, and pools of political talent. Central to this effort would be a continuing public explanation of the “community method” along with its promise and attendant responsibilities. An important by-product

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could be a periodic, well-publicized periodic assessment undertaken by an independent, international authority that would rate all nations' democratic performance, much as is done today by the American NGO Freedom House.

8. *Examine, with a view to continuous updating, existing and proposed "community" ties among all established democracies.* This could be part of the work of a special think tank (RAND or the International Institute for Strategic Studies are possible models) to study the processes of democracy building within societies as these relate to improved international institutions, and the place of democracy education and civic responsibility in general education. It could also involve the study of how a nascent community of democracies could grow at the margins.

## Conclusion

This paper has not proposed a *new* paradigm for international relations, but *an improved* paradigm to resume, expand, and update earlier American policies aimed at democracy promotion and democratic-community-building as the surest path toward a Democratic Peace. To move decisively in this direc-

tion, the core high capacity democracies, gradually expanding, would pursue *community building* instead of *Realpolitik* in conducting their intra-community relationships. A second tier grouping of democracies, but ones with less "capacity," would adhere to the core as readily as circumstances allow. This process would imply that in order to manage this grouping's relationships with strategically significant countries on the democratic margins or outside them (e.g., Russia, China), the core democracies would collectively continue to employ traditional balance of power methods but would strive to bring "outside" countries into their zone of democratic peace. Encouraging systematic cooperation with non-democracies and transitioning democracies could be a promising way to demonstrate the link between democracy promotion and the resolution of the major global problems of our time. □

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## NOTES

1. Amy Chua, *Day of Empire* (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2007)
2. High capacity democracies account for about 85% of world GDP, but only 12% of its population. They collectively embrace the values of the Enlightenment and share a broader range of interests than any other grouping.

# Union of the West Endgame

## A Straw Man Constitutional Amendment

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In his recent book, former French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur proposes a Union between Europe and the United States. Balladur argues that the need for such a union is urgent. Richard Rosecrance, writing in *The American Interest and Foreign Affairs*, has similarly pointed to the urgent economic need for larger markets. Rosecrance further reminded his readers that in 1938 Clarence Streit called for “an Atlantic Federal Union of the Free” to counter fascism. Streit’s book *Union Now* was a best-seller in its time, and the movement that he founded (which is carried on today by the Streit Council for a Union of Democracies) had considerable success over many years, with strong support from luminaries such as Senator Estes Kefauver as well as many others.

The implementation mechanism on which Streit and his organization focused the greater part of their energies was the Atlantic Union Resolution, introduced annually into the United States Congress for many years. The concept was to replicate Philadelphia, through having the free Western nations nominate delegates to a Constitutional Convention at which the new union would be hammered out more or less as happened so successfully in 1789.

Unfortunately (for those who favored such a union), when the Atlantic Union Resolution finally passed, the occupant of the White House, who was required to name the US delegates, did not favor the

union idea and so failed to name advocates as delegates. The result was what you would expect: a mere exchange of pleasantries.

Given this history and the breadth and strength of current interest in the possible formation of such a union, I thought it would be interesting and perhaps constructive to point to a means of (democratically) short-circuiting the process for creating such a union. I am not proposing the adoption of this means (and neither, certainly, is the Streit Council, of which I am President), but consideration of the mechanism that I have crafted illuminates many of the critical issues central to forming any such Union of the West.

In *Union Now*, Clarence Streit himself could not resist providing an “illustrative constitution” for his proposed union. It is in the same spirit that I have drafted the following “28<sup>th</sup> Amendment” to the United States Constitution for critical examination:

**Section 1.** *The Constitution of the United States of America, including its twenty-seven articles of Amendment, is subsumed under this article, which shall have precedence.*

**Section 2.** *This article extends the sovereignty of the individual over that of any state.*

**Section 3.** *We the people of the West do Establish this the Constitution of the West. This Establishment*

*shall take effect upon the adoption of this article by the United States of America and by a majority of the states of the European Union; these actions together shall create the Union of the West.*

**Section 4.** *All legislative powers shall be vested in a House of the People, comprised of members elected by approval voting from compact districts of nearly equal population.*

**Section 5.** *The House shall elect by approval voting a Prime Minister who will exercise all Executive powers, subject to the confidence of the House; regardless, an election of the House shall take place at least every six years.*

**Section 6.** *The House shall create an independent judiciary.*

**Section 7.** *All powers not specifically mentioned in this article shall remain with the people, and with the United States of America, and with the European Union, and with the states constituting the United States, and with the states constituting the European Union.*

**Section 8.** *Every person who is a citizen of the United States of America, or who is a citizen of a country of the European Union, shall be a citizen of the West, and if aged at least 18, be eligible to vote.*

**Section 9.** *The House of the People shall have the power to admit additional states to this Union.*

**Section 10.** *Union powers shall be limited to:*

- a) Union government and citizenship*
- b) Union defense force*
- c) Union customs-free economy*
- d) Union money*
- e) Union postal and communications system*
- f) Union patents and protection of intellectual property*
- g) Union protection of Habeas Corpus, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from intrusion, and other freedoms and liberties.*

In showing this draft amendment to Americans and Europeans alike, I have found uniform dislike, which suggests to me that there might be something to this approach! However, advocacy of adoption of

this amendment is not my goal, which is rather to contemplate, through this prism, the nature of the resulting union and to express a few thoughts on how such a union might come about.

I will confine my discussion to the various sections of the draft article, so as to get the fullest stimulative value out of the draft amendment.

**Section 1.** *The Constitution of the United States of America, including its twenty-seven articles of Amendment, is subsumed under this article, which shall have precedence.*

Perhaps the most powerful American argument against the approach of creating a union by amending the US Constitution is the extreme difficulty of passing any amendment, much less one so sweeping. But if our goal is to create a true federal union comprising (initially, at least) the present European Union and the United States, the only alternative to a constitutional amendment is a treaty. Recent history shows the extreme difficulty of passing any treaty remotely similar to the present draft—I am thinking of the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court (ICC). But the reluctance of United States administrations and Senators to subject American citizens to the ICC centers precisely on the lack of democratic authority behind such a court. For that very reason, it might actually be easier to pass the present draft amendment than to ever get the ICC treaty through. If that is so, perhaps this draft should be given more serious consideration than I am giving it here.

The most powerful European argument against the approach of creating a union by amending the US Constitution is European repugnance at “joining the United States of America.” But just as Americans have their problems with the ICC, so Europeans have problems with their own European Union. One clear example is the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, in the voting booth, by citizens of France and the Netherlands. This difficulty arises, I think, for the very same fundamental reason: the lack of democratic legitimacy in the proffered instrument. For it is true that the European Union’s so-called “constitution” was not a constitution at all but was merely a treaty, much as the ICC is a treaty.

Prime Minister Balladur himself argues strongly that Europe needs to get its house in order before launching his projected union with the United

States. But Europeans might have second (that is, more favorable) thoughts about the amendment approach, as they realize two things: first, its adoption would preempt many of their internal European Union difficulties, rendering them largely moot. And second, EU members would not be subject to the United States Constitution beyond this one new article of amendment.

On the second point, of course no one would even toy with the idea of the European countries simply joining the United States: *e.g.* Germany becoming a state with two senators and so forth. The idea is absurd and is just one among a vast number of objections that would emerge on the applicability of the United States' Second Amendment to Germany. But this only highlights the beauty of the idea under discussion in this paper; that under this approach, the Second Amendment (and many other problematic items) would not apply to Germany or to any of the other countries of the European Union.

**Section 2.** *This article extends the sovereignty of the individual over that of any state.*

Only anarchists reject government totally. Libertarians recognize the need for a minimal level of governance, as do conservatives. Liberals are warmer to broader governmental roles, but like libertarians and conservatives they recognize that the purpose of having government at all is solely to strengthen, not limit, the sovereignty, security, and liberties of the individual. The recognition of this fundamental principle has evolved over the centuries, and I make it a separate section because of its fundamental character. It will be available to courts, under the putative union, to guide in the interpretation of the Constitution. It is the only item in my draft that I would describe as political, as opposed to architectural. The remainder of the draft Article has, as a goal, only the effective implementation of Section 2.

Streit's illustrative constitution is much longer and more detailed than the present draft. That is no accident; I strove to include only the *sine qua non* and nothing more. There are huge issues that would arise were the present draft ever to be taken seriously. Just as in 1789, when a side deal to locate the capital in the South helped seal the deal, such questions as the official language(s) and location of the capital would figure large in any attempt to

launch the union by this mechanism. I ignore these issues, important as they would be in reality.

**Section 3.** *We the people of the West do Establish this the Constitution of the West. This Establishment shall take effect upon the adoption of this article by the United States of America and by a majority of the states of the European Union; these actions together shall create the Union of the West. "We the people ... ." The Constitution of the European Union opens with the less than stirring words "His Majesty the King of the Belgians." The present draft amendment, surely, might do better in European voting booths?*

One envisages the campaign: the introduction of the amendment into the United States House of Representatives and, upon passage, into the United States Senate, and then into the parliaments of Europe—perhaps, initially, the European Parliament. Passage in the US Senate would then require approval of the various state legislatures. Prohibition took thirteen months, from start to finish—please do not tell me it is impossible. For the Europeans, I recommend using voting booths, but there I am violating my self-restriction to the *sine qua non*.

**Section 4.** *All legislative powers shall be vested in a House of the People, comprised of members elected by approval voting from compact districts of nearly equal population.*

If Malta, the smallest member of the European Union by population, has a single representative in the House, then the House of the People will have just under 2,000 members (the present European Parliament has 750 members). The United States would have 38% of the seats and the Americans and the British combined would have 45%.

In creating my draft, a major goal has been to restrict the draft to the *sine qua non*; not just to avoid messy and inessential battles, but to ensure that the fundamentals are done right. I hope that anyone who should choose to proceed on the basis of this draft would preserve these essentials: one person, one vote; compact districts; approval voting, since it tends to produce unity rather than division; and consensus rather than confrontation.

**Section 5.** *The House shall elect by approval voting a Prime Minister who will exercise all*

*Executive powers, subject to the confidence of the House; regardless, an election of the House shall take place at least every six years.*

The Union of the West will be unicameral, at least according to my draft. My draft architecture is intended to produce strong, effective, and responsible government. There is no President—the Executive is composed of the Prime Minister and her cabinet. Approval voting for the Prime Minister is again to favor unity and consensus. And the government will really be able to govern if it has a strong enough majority. But should it lose the confidence of the House of the People, new elections would follow immediately.

**Section 6.** *The House shall create an independent judiciary.*

I have avoided any attempt to guess how this might be structured.

**Section 7.** *All powers not specifically mentioned in this article shall remain with the people, and with the United States of America, and with the European Union, and with the states constituting the United States, and with the states constituting the European Union.*

This section reinforces Section 2, and limits the reach of laws that are passed by the House. This is the most delicate of issues, exactly as it was in 1789. The House is limited to the items in Section 10, to be discussed briefly below.

**Section 8.** *Every person who is a citizen of the United States of America, or who is a citizen of a country of the European Union, shall be a citizen of the West, and if aged at least 18, be eligible to vote.*

This section is self-explanatory.

**Section 9.** *The House of the People shall have the power to admit additional states to this Union.*

This is a crucial power. The European Union at present is wrestling with the problem and opportunity of Turkey. The United States is wrestling with the problem (and, by this section, opportunity) of Mexico. The debate on this amendment would have special focus on this article. My aim, of course, is to make possible the orderly admission of Turkey and Mexico, neither of which could perhaps ever happen without the creation of the larger Union of the West.

**Section 10.** *Union powers shall be limited to:*

- a) *Union government and citizenship*
- b) *Union defense force*
- c) *Union customs-free economy*
- d) *Union money*
- e) *Union postal and communications system*
- f) *Union patents and protection of intellectual property*
- g) *Union protection of Habeas Corpus, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from intrusion, and other freedoms and liberties.*

My list for Section 10 was generated simply by consulting *Union Now*, in which Streit emphasized that his proposed Union would be designed “to provide effective common government in our democratic world in those fields where such common government will clearly serve man’s freedom better than separate governments.”<sup>1</sup> Streit specified, in particular, “a union government and citizenship, a union defense force, a union customs-free economy, a union money, and a union postal and communications system.”<sup>2</sup> My two added items I regard as part of my *sine qua non*. The final item is this draft constitution’s succinct Bill of Rights. Let us suppose that this amendment approach is impossible. What approach may be possible? Try once again on the Atlantic Union Resolution? Build Balladur’s consultative structures? Attempt a treaty linking the European Union with the United States?

Europe gives us powerful guidance based on its history since the end of World War II. While a United States of Europe has not been created, Streit, I think, would have been amazed at the degree of success that has been achieved using the incremental approach that he denigrated. At the Streit Council we think that the best approach at present is a combination of education and the building and strengthening of existing institutions and proposed new institutions such as those advocated by Prime Minister Balladur. But we agree heartily with both Balladur and Richard Rosecrance on the urgency of the need for substantive progress, especially given the new economic climate that we all face. At the Streit Council, we favor Union Now. □

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NOTES

1. Clarence Streit, *Union Now* (US: Harper & Row Publishers, 1976), 4
2. *Ibid.*

# The Road to a Transatlantic Community

David G. Wagner

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Over the last few years, there has been some interest in renewing and strengthening the framework of US-European institutions. It builds on similar previous accomplishments including the Transatlantic Declaration in 1990, the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in 1995, the Joint Action Plan in 1995, the Transatlantic Policy Network in 2007, and the Transatlantic Economic Council in 2007. The most recent example of this is the Transatlantic Energy Council, which was created on November 4, 2009. Of all the joint ventures, the NTA was the most ambitious, spawning the Transatlantic Business, Consumer, Environmental, and Legislators' Dialogues. This list of agreements has been called out of date and in need of renewal. Many new proposals, which would further strengthen Euro-Atlantic cooperation, are currently being considered.

In 2009, former French Premier Edouard Balladur called for a "Union of the West." He advocated the creation of an Executive Council consisting of the Presidents of the United States and the European Union, which would meet every three months. There would also be a permanent joint secretariat to coordinate policies in international fora, in particular the World Trade Organization (WTO). On March 26, 2009, the European Parliament proposed that the NTA be replaced and upgraded by a Transatlantic Political Council (TPC). Chaired by the EU High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (the EU's new foreign minister) and the US Secretary of State and meeting every three months, the new body would conduct "systematic high-

level consultation and coordination in respect of foreign and security policy."<sup>1</sup>

## Unresolved Questions

Before these proposals can receive serious consideration, a number of questions need to be worked out. First, exactly what would the "Union" or the TPC coordinate? A rigid regular schedule of high-level meetings is a thin agenda. The Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 already committed the US and the EU to semi-annual US-EU Summits with preparatory ministerial and senior-level meetings. The vacuousness of this process contributed to President Obama's cancellation of his participation in the planned US-EU Summit in Madrid, Spain, and led the two parties to agree to meet at the summit only "when we both feel the need for one," in the words of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton.<sup>2</sup>

Certainly the US-EU agenda contains important issues. Daniel S. Hamilton and Frances G. Burwell compiled a comprehensive list under ten headings in their report "Standing Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging a Strategic US-EU Partnership."<sup>3</sup> One of them, "Build a Barrier-Free Transatlantic Marketplace," would aim, essentially, at creating a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA), although Hamilton might not choose that label. Such an initiative would require the engagement of the highest levels of political leadership in both the United States and the EU. A TAFTA enjoys some support on the other side of the ocean, but in the past France has vetoed the

project before it got started.<sup>4</sup>

Reform of financial regulation in the wake of the economic recession is currently prominent, as the United States, the EU, and the United Kingdom seek to identify and enact reforms to prevent a recurrence of the financial crash. A US-EU arrangement would set a model for the rest of the world. These reforms should be coordinated in order to keep financial institutions from playing the two sides of the Atlantic against each other. The coordination should also retain the openness that fueled a tremendous expansion of the world's economy. Unfortunately, the result to date appears to be scant, with each side pursuing its own plans and exhorting the other side to adopt the same rules. As a further complication, France and Germany seem to be determined to force reforms on the United Kingdom and the City of London which would certainly make Paris and Frankfurt more competitive financial centers in Europe, and only possibly help reform the world financial system.

Competition rules are a second large area for productive cooperation between the United States and the European Union. Competition policy in the EU has been evolving more rapidly than has anti-trust policy in the United States with its longer pedigree. While both sides have exercised understanding and forbearance regarding the other's actions, divergent policies and enforcement have upset transatlantic relations on a number of occasions. Complete coordination is probably too much to ask for given the differing philosophies regarding the free market, national champions, and the economic role of governments. However, the channels for consultation and synchronization of policies should be wide, deep, and open.

Issues of mutual recognition of standards, especially of health, food safety, and the environment, are perennial items on the US-EU agenda. Here again, transatlantic differences in philosophy and scientific evaluation complicate matters. The suspicion lingers that standards on both sides of the ocean are set to restrict rather than

expand trade. Genetically modified foods, carbon taxes, and tanker aircraft are examples. Cooperation in homeland security/justice and home affairs has grown significantly since 9/11. The tragedy spurred a tighter integration among EU countries that is still evolving. Disputes over sharing passenger information and SWIFT code information demonstrate the importance of this area and the need for improved procedures. Historically, cooperation in international politics has been easier than in economic and commercial issues. The United States and the European Union coordinate on a wide range of international topics, and the results have been reasonably satisfactory.

The second question to be worked out concerns the EU's internal functioning. The EU is in the middle of a significant transformation in which the positions of "President" and "High Representative" are being established and staffed. No one knows yet how these offices will operate, how they will interrelate, how they will lead the EU, and how they will relate to the world. One commentator, Jean-Pierre Stroobants, has called for the formulation of a "European national interest."<sup>5</sup> The High Representative is supposed to have political clout and resource heft, although the Lisbon Treaty suggests the

Member States will be able to circumscribe tightly the High Representative's freedom of action. In addition, the EU's External Action Service is only in the first steps of being created, staffed, and organized. Until this new institutional arrangement is set, moving forward on new forms of US-EU cooperation will be difficult. The State Department cited uncertainty about who would speak for the EU with Obama as another reason for demurring on the Madrid Summit.

Third, the United States has its own problems. The return to the halcyon days of Europe's primacy in American foreign policy before George W. Bush has not materialized under the Obama Administration. In particular, Europeans are concerned that this



Source: EU Delegation to the USA

**The High Representative is supposed to have political clout and resource heft, although the Lisbon Treaty suggests the Member States will be able to circumscribe tightly the High Representative's freedom of action.**

President is giving more attention and higher priority to China and Asia than he is giving them. Even though the administration may be more aware of the centrality of the EU in European affairs than any of its predecessors were, it has not signaled any interest in binding itself to Europe in global policy.

### **A Bottom-Up Approach to Deepening Transatlantic Ties**

While the United States and the European Union sort out their own problems, some thought needs to be given to what mechanisms might best handle the common ones. A top-down approach centered on presidential summits forces action, but makes demands on leaders' time and attention, which they resist. The present system of policy meetings can produce results, but the final decisions are often made internally within the US government and the EU; summit meetings rarely close the deal except formally. There needs to be a broader horizontal engagement between the American and European bureaucracies beyond foreign ministries, activities

which the political leadership sometimes needs to authorize and activate. Both bureaucracies will need to become more flexible to permit transatlantic compromises and ratification. As the EU implements the Lisbon Treaty and US-EU relations evolve, there will be many opportunities to develop new modes of closer collaboration. □

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#### NOTES

1. European Parliament, "Resolution of 26 March 2009 on the state of transatlantic relations in the aftermath of the US elections," Document 2008/2199 (INI)
2. Valentina Pop, "EU-US summits to take place 'only when necessary,'" *EU Observer*, March 27, 2010
3. Daniel S. Hamilton and Frances G. Burwell, "Standing Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging a Strategic US-EU Relationship," Atlantic Council, December 2009
4. One recent example: Matti Aaltola, "EU:lle ja USA:lle sopisi yhteinen talousalue," *Helsingin Sanomat*, March 27, 2010
5. Jean-Pierre Stroobants, "Europe et Etats-Unis en quête d'un nouveau partenariat," *Le Monde*, March 27, 2010

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