



nity. (See November 1957 FREEDOM & UNION, page 3.)

This committee issued invitations to the Paris meeting. Because of the French crisis in May, it was not certain the meeting would be held until about a fortnight ahead of the date set. This situation, together with unexpected Parliamentary and other developments in Belgium, Britain and Canada which prevented participants from those countries from coming, reduced the attendance to representatives from France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Iceland and the United States. The main national organizations represented by delegates included the Atlantic Union Committee and Federal Union Inc., of the U.S., the French *Movement four*

*l'Union Atlantique* and the German *Union Atlantischer Föderalisten*.

With the French Movement as host, the meeting—together with a luncheon on July 3 and a reception on the 4th—was held in the Cercle Interallie, a club founded during World War I and situated on the rue Faubourg St. Honore a few numbers from the French 'White House' — the Palais de l'Elysee. The luncheon was marked by brilliant talks by two members of the French Movement — Raymond Aron, columnist of *Figaro* and author, and Edouard Bonnefous, a former Cabinet Minister.

In opening the meeting, General Billotte recalled its origin at Bruges. He noted that the dangers the Atlantic Community faced and the consequent need for Atlantic Union had been greatly augmented subsequently by the appearance of the first Sputnik in October, the persisting economic recession and the explosive situation in the Mideast. All this and more made it urgent that Atlantic Unionists in various countries should coordinate their efforts.

Mr. Streit pointed to reasons why such action would be necessary even if there were no Soviet danger. He saw little hope of the U.S. and British Governments providing the bold leadership Atlantic Union required, and feared that the domestic political situation he foresaw in the next year or so in both countries would lead to worse paralysis and consequent disaster. He saw more

hope in General de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer, but they faced "obvious" difficulties.

This situation, he held, made it essential that the Atlantic Union movement should be developed much more in western Europe. He explained that though there had been widespread response in 1939 to *Union Now*, and organizations had sprung up in Britain, France and elsewhere, the outbreak of the war had prevented the organization of an international movement and disorganized national committees in Europe. Moreover, then and thereafter, the original American organization, Federal Union, had been overloaded with the problems it faced in so vast a country as the U.S. It had concentrated

erlands (see "Where Charlemagne's Spirit Lives On," May FREEDOM & UNION) suggested that it might be better to organize a Benelux committee for Atlantic Union rather than national ones there; this would help in breaking down nationalistic concepts, and might be extended, and tried in other regions. He stressed that he, and many others, favored both Atlantic and European Union, and saw no conflict between the two movements, but he thought it essential to make this clear to European Unionists.

His son, George—the youngest participant, a graduate student in America and Paris—saw Atlantic Union as a star to hitch one's wagon to, though the struggle to achieve it might well take more than a lifetime. He emphasized the need of keeping spiritual values always in mind, invoking Providence and avoiding all religious or racial bars.

Ambassador de Dampierre agreed with Baron van Kessenich as regards European Union; he felt its aim should be to lead toward Atlantic Union; those working for either were working for the other. He added that as regards the European Common Market, leading French economists saw no obstacle in it to the subsequent creation of a similar Atlantic market.

Dr. Rudolf Wagner thought that creation of the International Movement would be particularly helpful in the German Federal Republic, where much remained to be done. His own organization's activity centered in Bavaria; it was more than ready to cooperate with others in building up the widest and strongest movement in West Germany and in this connection he regretted especially that Dr. Jaeger of the Bonn section of the ATA, who had planned to attend this meeting, had been unable to come. He saw the need for clarifying the Movement's position toward the ATA as well as toward the European Movement.

The Atlantic Movement, Dr. Wagner strongly believed, should work for an Atlantic federation rather than intermediate steps toward unity; public opinion was too little prepared for the former and it would be much more difficult to achieve than the Federal Union of the 13 States. He doubted that the proposed exploratory convention could or should be a constituent assembly.

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on them the more since European Atlantic Unionists had assured it that if the U.S. would call the proposed convention to explore Atlantic Union, there would be no difficulty in getting their countries to participate.

For these and other reasons the organization of an international movement for Atlantic Union had been delayed much too long already, Mr. Streit thought. Much too little had been done to organize national committees in Europe—with such notable exceptions as France and Britain. It was essential now to build up organizations throughout Western Europe at least as strong as those in the U.S.; this should be the International Movement's first goal.

Baron van Kessenich of The Neth-



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