Building a Political Community

H. Field Haviland, Jr.

In every political association which is formed upon the principle of uniting . . . a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs . . . to fly off from the common centre. . . . The government of the union . . . must, in short, possess all the means . . . of executing the powers with which it is entrusted. . . .[1]

These reflections on the centrifugal tendencies of interstate associations and the need for a stronger central union were penned 175 years ago by Alexander Hamilton, but they could easily have been taken, save for the quaint language, from the current debate on the Atlantic Community. As Hamilton pondered the problem of strengthening the integrating sinews of the new nation, so modern Hamiltons voice similar thoughts concerning the possibility of creating a stronger Atlantic political community.

Key Concepts

Since the blueprints are almost as numerous as the architects, it is difficult to be precise about the ideas being debated, especially the key concepts "Atlantic" and "political community." Yet a systematic examination of these subjects requires at least some approximate definitions, rough-hewn though they may be. As in the other chapters of this volume, the term "Atlantic" will not attempt to fix the composition of the Community in any rigid sense, but will refer to a generally recognized, though changing and variously interpreted, cluster of nations united as much by a state of mind as by objective

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[1] Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist or The New Constitution*, edited by Max Beloff (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948), pp. 72, 76–77.

conditions. By and large, one can say that their principal shared characteristics are: a relatively high degree of economic, social, and political development, deep immersion in Western culture, and current association with either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These conditions are constantly changing, however, and the membership of Atlantic institutions will never coincide exactly with the boundaries of Atlantic culture.

The other key phrase, "political community," refers to the total jurisdiction, authority, and organization of the whole complex of present and prospective Atlantic institutions, especially the principal directing and coordinating mechanism, currently the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Because the present Atlantic organisms have no formal "supranational" power, they cannot be called governmental in that sense. They are "political," however, because they are creatures and servants of governments. While the bonds joining the member states are not as strong as those uniting the internal components of mature national states, they comprise an embryonic, though still amorphous, "community." Much of the current significance of the term "political community" stems from the effort of some to foster a more virile, unified Atlantic association endowed with broader jurisdiction, greater authority, and more developed organization. Many advocates of this plan see it as a prelude to true Atlantic federation.

Interesting as the genealogy of this issue is, it cannot be dealt with here in detail. Instead, this discussion will concentrate primarily on identifying and analyzing the principal considerations that are relevant to the current dialogue concerning the political community question, with particular emphasis on United States policy. Attention will be devoted mainly to the relation between the political community issue and the various functional and geographic concerns of the Atlantic states. At the end of the paper, brief consideration will be given to certain organizational aspects of the subject.

While the extreme positions of immediate federation or immediate dissolution have few serious adherents, between these poles there is a crowded spectrum of schemes that deserve attention. For ease of discussion, these can be grouped roughly into two major schools of thought: maximalist and minimalist. The first is frequently identified with the views expressed in the Declaration of Paris adopted in January 1962 at the Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations, the most ambitious international gathering thus far of influential individuals favoring a reinforced Atlantic Community. This school, represented in the United States by the Atlantic Council, urges the accelerated develop-

ment of "a true Atlantic Community within the next decade," which would have broader and stronger powers than NATO.[2]

The minimalist position, closer to the policies of the present United States Administration, gives priority to the development of the European Community in order to strengthen the European side of an Atlantic "partnership" and favors relatively modest, gradual improvements in the Atlantic structure. A recent capsule formulation of this doctrine was enunciated by President Kennedy in his July 4, 1962, address at Philadelphia:

> The first order of business is for our European friends to go forward in forming the more perfect union which will some day make this [Atlantic] partnership possible. . . .
>
> The United States will be ready for a declaration of interdependence, . . . we will be prepared to discuss with a United Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American union founded here 173 years ago.[3]

Culture and Resources

One of the most deep-seated sentiments in favor of a stronger Atlantic political association is the view that, because our Atlantic neighbors seem to think, act, and look so much the way we do, they are the countries with which we could most agreeably and successfully enter into political marriage. They share a common dedication to democracy, reflecting not only an assumption that government can scarcely be viable unless it is nourished by the support of a majority of the people over the long run but also that democracy has something to do with certain basic rights due each individual. They enjoy the blessings of advanced technological and material progress, from television to atomic bombs. And they are linked by countless other similarities, such as a proclivity toward cleanliness and stomach ulcers. In a flight of lyrical language, the preamble of the "Declaration of Paris" sums up the cultural heritage of the West as follows:

> The Atlantic peoples have inherited a magnificent civilization whose origins include the early achievements of the Near East, the classical beauty of Greece, the juridical sagacity of Rome, the spiritual power of our religious traditions and the humanism of the Renaissance. Its latest flowering, the discoveries of modern science, allows an extraordinary mastery of the forces of nature.[4]

Despite these blessings, there are many, sometimes irksome, differences with-

[2] "U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO," Letter to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, H. Doc. 433, 87th Cong., 2nd Session, 1962.

[3] *The New York Times,* July 5, 1962.

[4] "U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO," *op. cit.,* p. 9.

in the Atlantic family. Some countries, such as Portugal and Turkey, leave much to be desired in the practice of democracy. Some areas have scarcely been touched by the wand of technological progress. Yet, it is true that the states which are normally thought of as part of the Atlantic family tend to share more in common with each other than with other nations and are generally more developed—economically, technically, socially, and politically. These would seem to be substantial foundations on which to build closer political relations.

But marriages do not thrive solely on cultural affinity. Man may not live by bread alone, but he can scarcely live without it. An important argument for closer political bonds between the United States and the other Atlantic states holds that European material resources are a critical increment essential to both the economic and strategic welfare of the United States. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote in 1962:

> The indispensable collaborator of the United States in providing security and opportunity for the free world is Western Europe. Geography, history, population, resources and technology all combine to make this so. Working together these two areas have twice the population and three times the productive capacity of the Soviet Union, and ample base for military defense and economic development. But if the Soviet Union should be able to control the production of Europe, our problems would soon be beyond our capacity to deal with them.[5]

The argument continues: unless European resources are joined with those of the United States within the embrace of a closer political association, it will be more difficult not only to protect them from falling into hostile hands but to develop them to their full potential.

An opposing thesis is that sufficient benefit can probably be gained from European resources without building a stronger Atlantic political roof over them, that the Western allies are not yet ready for such a union anyway, and that, even if they were, it might interfere with United States access to other important resources, particularly in the less developed countries. Political cooperation along more or less traditional lines, it is argued, is capable of assuring the United States the benefits of European economic and military strength, and the Atlantic partners are not prepared to be laced into any closer relationship. And, as the resources of the rest of the world, at least that portion that is accessible to the Atlantic states, become more developed and more closely linked to the West, it will be increasingly important to broaden the sphere of both political and economic intercourse to the widest limits feasible.

Weighing these contrapuntal views, the most persuasive response would

[5] "Fifty Years After," *The Yale Review*, Autumn 1961 (Vol. 51), p. 7.

seem to be that European resources are still more important to the United States than those of the underdeveloped countries, that the experience of the Six demonstrates that closer political affiliation with Europe would improve the coordinated development of Atlantic resources, that there are strong foundations for such collaboration, and that, properly oriented, such an association need not alienate but could strengthen relations with the emerging states.

Political Imperatives of the Military Role

At the heart of the matter lies the military problem. Providing for the common defense—institutionalized in NATO—which remains the most crucial and thus far the most effective function of the Atlantic grouping, generates the strongest pressures for closer political relations and, at the same time, confronts the political process with some of its most severe tests.

Gone are the days when nations could afford the luxury of splendid isolation in conducting their military affairs or of alliances hobbled by unlimited veto and vacillation. The new warfare demands new politics. Effective defense of the non-communist world requires rapid and coordinated deployment of substantial portions of the military resources of the Atlantic partners and is the most compelling immediate justification for strengthening the political bonds of the alliance. Governments and their constituents have made clear that they will not give the necessary support to maintain the collective military effort unless they feel that their interests are sufficiently represented and influential, through political as well as military channels, in controlling the hand that wields the sword. There needs to be closer political collaboration in shaping general allied military policy, with the emphasis currently on the balance between nuclear and conventional capabilities and on the development of a truly multilateral nuclear force. There needs to be more adequate meshing of political gears with regard to specific political questions which might trigger collective military action. If such political collaboration could be cultivated, it is argued that it would be the best way to strengthen the credibility of United States participation in the common defense and to counteract certain centrifugal tendencies such as the present French mood.

Others warn against leaning too heavily on the military case for political unity. While the defense function has thus far been the principal bridge spanning the Atlantic, it does not comprise the totality of Atlantic concerns, and it is not congenial to some members of the Atlantic circle, especially the neutrals. In these quarters there would be resistance to emphasizing political cooperation primarily to unify military policy. Even among the present NATO

powers, there are clashing defense doctrines. While it may be difficult for some to swallow de Gaulle's military philosophy that the unreliability of the American giant as the defender of Europe forces France to develop her own nuclear force, it is a fact of life which must be recognized. There is also the view that the creation of a wholly European nuclear defense union, apart from the United States' capability, would allay some fears by reducing reliance on the Americans and would discourage the establishment of independent national nuclear forces.[6] The stakes of military policy are so high, moreover, that governments will always play their defense cards close to their chest. And the experience of the past suggests that much collective military policy can be coaxed through the present political machine, rickety as it may seem, without having to design an entirely new model.

Persuasive though some of these views may appear, they are weak vessels with which to navigate today's rough seas. Granted that defense policy is a jealously guarded preserve of national sovereignty, the current military situation leaves little choice—if one reacts to the challenge rationally, which admittedly is a large "if." Surely it is clear by now that effective defense requires increased political as well as military integration among the Atlantic powers. While the chief objective is greater policy and operational unity, including a more equitable sharing of authority and responsibility—not a complicated organizational superstructure for its own sake—organizational innovation can help, and its creation can be an important part of developing better policy.

Political Requirements for Economic Cooperation

Oliver Franks, distinguished British economist and stateman, summarized the need for greater Atlantic integration in dealing with major economic problems:

> The partnership of the Atlantic group of nations cannot get where it wants simply by the established processes of the unanimity rule and the compromising out of agreement between national interests. . . . A new way has to be found: a new organization, institution or commission which will have sufficient standing, independence and initiative to formulate common solutions and put them forward to the governments of the several nations of the group, so that they will have to face in argument not merely each other but also and at the same time the solution proposed for the partnership as a whole as best realizing its common good.[7]

There are, as Franks suggested, at least four major economic problems that

[6] Ben T. Moore, *NATO and the Future of Europe* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), pp. 207–215.

[7] Oliver Franks, "Cooperation is not enough," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1962 (Vol. 41, No. 1), p. 33.

call for a more integrated approach. The first is the need for intimate cooperation in providing technical and capital assistance to the developing countries. The second is to achieve a more unified approach in the trade field, especially to expand the export earnings of the emerging states. Third, collaboration is needed to improve the international monetary system, particularly to strengthen reserves available to cushion the shock of periodic monetary crises. Finally, there is the need to find ways to meet the challenge of the West's overflowing agricultural cornucopia by improving distribution and consumption as well as controlling production.

A major stimulus to greater economic unity within the Atlantic club is the challenge of the Six. These states are ahead in the race for economic integration, and they are not enthusiastic about slowing their gait to wait for others to catch up. Professor Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community, warned at the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in November 1962:

> Even if American public opinion were by some miracle to accept the idea of America's "joining the European Community," thus transforming it into "an Atlantic Community," I have grave doubts as to whether it would be feasible in practice. So vast a geographical extension of the Community, I am convinced, would wreck the whole operation.[8]

Other states outside the Six, particularly the neutrals, act like skittish parents who resist having a favorite daughter, economic cooperation, married to an unwelcome suitor, political-military cooperation. It is equally difficult, as Hallstein pointed out, to persuade the United States, guided by a Congress that still prefers the Anglo-Saxon model of cooperation to the European model of integration, to relinquish any significant degree of sovereignty in the economic field. The passage of the Trade Expansion Act dealt the President a strong hand with which to bargain the Six into lowering their trade threshold to the United States and the rest of the world, but it was no license to merge the American and European economic communities into a supranational union. The most promising approach would seem to be to continue strengthening existing arrangements for coordinating United States and European economic programs, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, gradually building a stronger consensus on which ultimately to build a closer association.

[8] Walter Hallstein, "NATO and the EEC" (Address at the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, Paris, November 1962).

General Political Cooperation

As ripples spread in concentric waves from a central impulse, so historically the functions of government have often expanded from some initial emergency cooperation, frequently a military alliance against a common enemy. Similarly, it has been proposed that Atlantic cooperation, born originally of defense operations, be expanded to include broader cooperation, embracing general political and economic as well as military problems. Almost every international problem, it is argued, whether it be a communist incursion against South Vietnam, a glut of coffee in Brazil, or Portuguese policy toward Angola, affects the interests of the Atlantic states. Each field of policy, be it political, economic, or military, merges with every other. Those who go the farthest along this road say that the ultimate goal must be nothing less than a true Atlantic federation. Anything short of that will not enable the collaborating nations to make the most of their material and cultural potential. Such a comprehensive approach offers the widest variety of benefits to the participating states, balancing gains and losses on the broadest scale, and offers the most effective response to the total strategy of the communists.

Against this heroic vision is ranged the ineluctable fact that none of the Atlantic states, large or small, rich or poor, is eager to yield one iota more authority to a central mechanism than seems absolutely essential for purposes that each agrees can be achieved in no other way—mainly defense and now a limited degree of aid and trade cooperation. This is not solely because of traditional insularity but because each nation has different interests which overlap those of other states to only a limited extent. Because of its globe-circling commitments and relative freedom from imperial entanglements, the United States looks on colonial questions differently from France or Belgium. The Europeans do not feel as directly threatened as the United States by the turmoil in Latin America. To expand the mandate of the Atlantic club too broadly too soon runs the risk of generating friction that is not only unnecessary for the central purposes of the group but may actually jeopardize those purposes. The most feasible strategy is to do what is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the present essential activities of the group and to expand beyond that base only as added receptivity to the Atlantic approach is cultivated by current success. This suggests an emphasis on relatively modest improvements rather than vaulting innovation.

Discouraging Communist Intervention

Another way of looking at the political community problem is to turn from studying its implications for various functional policy areas to examine its bearing on United States relations with individual states or groups of states. A popular refrain in favor of a stronger political association is that it would be a sturdier shield against the divisive tactics of the Soviet camp. With the flock divided and confused, it is all too easy for the communist wolf to play one perplexed lamb against another. The Germans are threatened with incineration if they collaborate with the West or are wooed with unification if they promise to stay aloof. NATO members are denounced as warmongers whenever they try to strengthen the alliance, particularly by arming Germany, and are offered tempting visions of a benign European settlement if they will abandon NATO. The neutrals are excoriated whenever they incline slightly toward the West, and are plied with assorted goodies if they agree to lean the other way in order to keep their neutrality virginal. The best counter-strategy for these disruptive tactics is to lace the Atlantic partners into so tight a political union that they cannot be pried apart.

Urging a stronger barrier against the Russian bear and the Chinese dragon may not, however, be the best argument to win general support for the Atlantic political community. Some expressions of this thesis have been regarded, especially in Europe, as unduly alarmist and negative. Such logic, it is said, exaggerates the communist threat, overstresses the vulnerability of Europe to such tactics, ignores hopeful tendencies in the communist world, and impedes efforts toward reconciliation. Far from discouraging communist erosion, such a strategy, some contend, might intensify communist fear of the West and result in an escalation of tension.

What Atlantic political cooperation is for is a more appealing justification than what it is against. In raising one's sights, however, one cannot ignore the gnawing of hostile termites. Efforts toward greater political integration would be a salutary deterrent against such insidious forces, and, if undertaken with a clear enunciation of the constructive and responsible objectives that would animate the effort, should give the communists no legitimate cause to fear any dangerously aggressive action from the West.

Relations with the Six

Within the Atlantic realm stands the citadel of the Six who have long pledged themselves to build a true political union on the foundations of their

three functional communities. In his May 1950 Magna Carta of the European Community, Robert Schuman emphasized that the ultimate and essential objective of economic integration was political integration: "The pooling of coal and steel will immediately provide . . . a first step in the federation of Europe . . . a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by bloody conflicts."[9] This special relationship among some of the Atlantic countries raises prickly questions for the larger association. Can the political relations of the two communities, one composed of part of the membership of the other and with currently more ambitious plans for supranational integration, be developed simultaneously without locking horns, or are they inherently contradictory?

Those in the vanguard of the Atlantic movement have taken pains to announce publicly not only that they bear no malice toward the political integration of the Six but that they welcome this development as a positive contribution to the growth of the larger group. "It is my own belief," wrote former Secretary of State Christian Herter in January 1963, "that the integration of Europe and discussions for the formulation of a true Atlantic Community can proceed along almost parallel lines."[10] It is natural and fitting, according to this view, that those countries that have grown close to each other because of harmonious cultures and interests should develop a special relationship. At the same time there are important reasons, which have been discussed above, why these nations should concurrently develop closer bonds with the other Atlantic countries, and the nature of the European Community would seem to interpose no insurmountable obstacle to such a development. On the contrary, the political maturation of the Six could result in institutional and conceptual developments that would provide useful incentives and examples for the larger community. To the extent that the Six succeed in merging their political personalities, they can increasingly act as a single unit in their relations with the rest of the Atlantic group. If they fail to move in that direction, especially with the inclusion of additional countries such as the United Kingdom, as some observers suggest may be the case, it is argued that the political growth of the Atlantic Community will be more desirable than ever.

But even such a staunch champion of Atlantica as Mr. Herter admits that:

> Talks with European political leaders and others who have studied the problem of how to achieve greater unity have shown me that the great majority feel that Europe must settle its own political integration before discussing with Canada

[9] Roy Pryce, *The Political Future of the European Community* (London: John Marshbank, 1962), p. 97.

[10] Christian A. Herter, "Atlantica," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1963 (Vol. 41, No. 2), p. 301.

> and the United States the specific constitutional character of any greater Atlantic Community.[11]

A powerful motivation in the minds of some advocates of the Atlantic movement, expressed more vehemently and aggressively in some quarters than in others, is the desire to use the broader community as a lever to pry open the European enclave as widely as possible in order to gain maximum benefits for the United States and its friends, including the Japanese and the Latin Americans. The goal is not only to gain access to the burgeoning European market but to persuade the Europeans to make more generous contributions to joint defense and develpment assistance programs. Far from waiting until the European structure is completed, the Atlanticans would move immediately to persuade the Europeans to open their door as widely as possible toward the outside world.

Many Europeans as well as Americans and others fear, however, that a strong Atlantic thrust at this time may jeopardize the European enterprise with consequent ill effects for the broader community. Exposing the European economy prematurely to the winds of international competition may cool the integrating ardor before it has had time to achieve the requisite degree of fusion. Holding uncompromisingly to the Atlantic framework of military cooperation under present circumstances may accentuate current divisive tendencies and discourage the Europeans from shouldering their proper share of the burden. It is even argued that some enemies of European unification use the Atlantic alternative as a weapon to oppose the advancement of the Six without any real intention of favoring the wider grouping. It is not surprising that some proponents of European unification have reached the conclusion expressed by the Italian federalist, Altiero Spinelli:

> It has become necessary to choose between two forms of supranational political power—one constituted by American hegemony, the other by an over-all European government. . . . The only instances where the idea of European unity has yielded results—modest but real—is where it was not in competition with the idea of American hegemony; whereas it has failed to prosper wherever the ground was covered with Atlantic vegetation.[12]

Recent developments would seem to confirm one of the basic tenets of current United States policy: Europe united will be a healthier partner than Europe divided. Until further integration has been achieved, partnership runs the danger of being domination or chaos. To allow Atlanticism to thwart such

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 300.

[12] Altiero Spinelli, "Atlantic Pact or European Unity," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1962 (Vol. 40, No. 4), p. 545.

unity would be a disservice to America's own interests. Aspirations for an Atlantic Community should be leavened by recognition of the fact that the Six and other states that may become associated with them are far more ready for real integration than is the United States. Still there is a community of interest that links the Six with other Atlantic states, and it is appropriate and feasible to strengthen that fabric by developing common policies and institutions. It is also proper to use this effort to remind the Six of their broader responsibilities so long as such initiatives do not seriously undermine the narrower community.

The United Kingdom and the Neutrals

Outside the European Community but within the Atlantic group lie the British and the European neutral states, which pose additional problems for Atlantic political cooperation. While the British situation is quite different from that of the neutrals, it is useful in some respects to treat them together.

A stronger Atlantic political community is sometimes advocated on the ground that it would counteract the current British inclination toward the European Community. Those who urge Albion not to join the European club contend that an Atlantic political union would ease much of Britain's dilemma by combining in a single association her relationship with the United States, which is a central concern of the United Kingdom, and her ties with the Six. Others maintain that, if Britain were to join the European Community, a strong Atlantic political mechanism would be more important than ever as a means of keeping the European ramparts as low as possible. The dialogue concerning the neutrals is much the same except that even defenders of the European Community have never been especially eager to see the neutrals join the family, primarily because their special status would compel them to resist political-military collaboration. Nor have the neutrals displayed any marked enthusiasm for becoming full members of the union.

The most persuasive argument against a strong Atlantic political system in relation to Britain's position is that such an initiative would tend to dampen Britain's ardor for joining the European Community. This result would cut against the grain of the doctrine, currently espoused by the United States government, that it is in the American interest that Britain enter the community in order to help build a more viable European partner, a policy that should result in a net gain for both Britain and her European colleagues. Furthermore, there are those on both sides of the Atlantic who do not relish the prospect of closer Anglo-American ties that would give each of the two countries greater

influence over, and responsibilities toward, the other. These considerations are not as relevant for the neutrals because they are not expected to become as closely linked as the British to either the European or the Atlantic political communities.

The Undernourished Nations

As the votaries of Atlantica turn toward the emerging states, they find themselves engaged in a rather delicate balancing act. On the one hand, they look to a strengthened Atlantic political community as an instrument to weave together the many far-reaching threads of the members' political and economic interests in the underdeveloped nations. On the other hand, the Atlanticans bend over backwards to make clear that this is not to be an exclusive white man's club designed to impose a neo-colonialist imperium. While they stress that closer Atlantic cooperation is a critical prerequisite for a more viable approach to the problems of the developing nations, they emphasize that the Atlantic Community cannot be effective unless it operates as part of far broader collaborative relations.

Suez, Indochina, and Cuba are cited by the pro-Atlantica contingent as typical conflagrations in the underdeveloped world that singed the coattails of more than one Atlantic power but that were dealt with more often than not with a minimum of concord and a maximum of discord. Far from closing ranks in the face of such threats, many Atlantic states were reluctant to acknowledge any responsibility whatsoever; others rode off in various directions with precious little consultation or cooperation. Because such crises provide tinder that might ignite World War III, the Atlantica group insists that the Western partners cannot affort the luxury of anarchy but must strengthen the Atlantic mechanism for harmonizing relevant national policies and operations.

In predicaments such as these, however, perhaps more than in any others, it is especially difficult to corral all of the concerned member states within a single policy consensus. The Berlin question may lend itself to such treatment because it is generally recognized by a majority of the principal Atlantic states to be a clear, direct, and major threat, and they are inclined to agree that an effective counter-strategy requires their cooperation. These conditions are seldom present to the same degree in situations involving the underdeveloped countries. The Cuban question struck Americans as a clear, direct, and major threat, but it did not so impress many who live on the other side of the Atlantic. Even had they been willing to concede this point, many of them would not have agreed that the situation required collective Atlantic action. The same has been true of other situations in Africa and Asia.

The emerging countries would resist stronger Atlantic coordination concerning such issues on the ground that it would reinforce the "colonial club" by pressing the more liberal powers, such as the United States, to give greater support to the colonialists in return for reciprocal concessions, particularly in relation to the Cold War. Lack of such coordination, they say, would be more in keeping with the needs of the times. The colonialists would be more isolated, and the relatively progressive United States and others would be freer to facilitate the inevitable and necessary march toward self-determination. Others argue that the Atlantic school exaggerates the frailties of the present system and the virtues of their prescription. Much can be, and is, achieved under present arrangements—bilaterally, in various regional groupings, in *ad hoc* working parties, and through the United Nations.

Another objective of the Atlantica plan is to use the reinforced political community to coordinate economic with political policies, to prod the members into carrying more of the burden of economic and social assistance, and to coordinate that assistance more effectively. The 1962 Declaration of Paris recommended as a major goal

> that the Atlantic Community increase its already considerable participation in development programmes of this kind, through direct financial and technical measures: through increased shares in UN programmes, OECD programmes and other multilateral efforts. . . . [13]

The Six are too narrow a base for dealing with the emerging states, say the Atlantic advocates. Preferential trade arrangements with certain former colonial territories tend to encourage uneconomical commercial patterns and exclude products from non-associated underdeveloped countries. A strengthened Atlantic Community, it is argued, would be an instrumentality for enlarging the scope of economic cooperation to include not only other important Atlantic countries but the rest of the world as well. Still there would be room, under this strategy, for the participation of an integrated European Community so long as it consented to harmonize its policies with those of the broader framework.

Is it necessarily desirable, however, to harness such economic programs with the political objectives of the Atlantic Community? To do so will collide with some of the same divergences of interests that bedevil the political issues. It will offend those who hope to protect the economic programs from being bent too far to serve political purposes. It will jar the nerves of the neutrals by trying to draw them closer to the political arena. And it will offend the under-

[13] "U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO," *op. cit.*, p. 12.

developed peoples themselves, the large majority of whom tend to look on any linking of aid to Atlantic politics as a plot to chain them to the chariot of Western imperialism.

Through this complex antiphony of point and counterpoint, there runs a recurrent theme that cannot be denied: the involvement of the Atlantic powers in the developing areas is of major and continuing significance to their vital interests, collectively as well as individually, including the possibility of serious military action. Because of the critical relation of Atlantic cooperation to United States security, it is important that there be more effective coordination of Atlantic policy and action toward the emerging nations on issues of major political import. This need does not argue for the automatic acceptance of European views but rather for increased diligence in communicating, negotiating, and reconciling relevant national positions on such matters. The United States has often championed and should continue to champion, wherever it sees fit, progressive policies designed to facilitate long-range harmonization of the interests of both the more and the less developed countries. This policy has sometimes generated, and will doubtless continue to generate, some serious differences of opinion within the family which cannot simply be swept under the carpet but must be frankly discussed and, hopefully, resolved. If relations with the emerging countries are to be cultivated with optimum efficacy, it is important that Atlantic political cooperation be developed in a manner that will not be abrasive to the continuing and understandable sensitivity of the new nations to what they consider the "colonialist club." This suggests moving carefully and inconspicuously, placing primary emphasis on an undramatic strengthening of existing procedures and mechanisms rather than launching more flamboyant innovations.

Windows toward the United Nations

Correlative to the underdeveloped nations' queasiness about the Atlantic giant is their affection for the United Nations, which they regard as their special friend, an organization that listens to them with a sensitive ear and ministers to their needs. Important segments of opinion in the more developed countries, especially elites imbued with benevolent sentiments toward the rest of the world, give warm support to the United Nations and tend to see any reinforcement of the Atlantic structure as undermining the foundations of the United Nations. This leads Mr. Herter to write:

> The public reaction in this country to the idea of a closely knit Atlantic Community will hinge in considerable measure on whether the American people feel

that the development of such a regional community might injure the world body's effectiveness.[14]

The evident infirmities that afflict the United Nations are cited as justification for shoring up Atlantic political cooperation. Frequent complaints are that the Cold War has seriously hobbled the peace-keeping role of the United Nations and that the new nations which have crowded into the world Organization in recent years have a voice in it beyond what would seem justified by their relative resources and international position. Closer political collaboration under the Atlantic banner would, it is said, compensate for these deficiencies by providing a more adequate instrument for coordinating and serving the political interests of the principal democratic states, on which the security of the world largely rests, and for relating their economic development programs to their political objectives. Conceding that much business can, should, and probably will, continue to be conducted through the United Nations, the Atlantic adherents maintain that firmer Atlantic political cooperation, exercised within the framework of the broader Organization, will improve the effectiveness of the United Nations.

Atlantica cannot, however, wall itself off from the surrounding world neighborhood, no matter how aggravating the growing pains of the younger nations may seem to the venerable states of the West. Since the Second World War, the emerging peoples have gained increasingly in their capacity to affect the interests of the developed states and, at the same time, to offer the West opportunities for constructive economic, social, and political collaboration. In attempting to cope with these challenges, the United Nations can, if used with positive motivation and imaginative skill, make a significant contribution to the welfare of both the more and the less developed states. Its special advantages, compared with an Atlantic political community, are that its globe-girdling membership provides connecting links of regular contact and consultation among most major communities of the world and, because it is regarded as the servant of all these Members, it has readier access to more countries than any narrower organization, as demonstrated in the cases of Suez and the Congo. The Atlantic states should recognize these attributes and make good use of them. It is quite consistent with this approach to reinforce Atlantic political collaboration, but it would seem advisable to do it quietly and tactfully not only because the new nations are suspicious of such tendencies but because the Atlantic states themselves have displayed no great haste to move in this direction.

[14] Herter, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

Strength Through Organization

Inevitably, the great debate has inspired a rich variety of blueprints for remodeling the Atlantic structure and process. Easy as it may be to dismiss this speculation as premature and utopian gimmickry, at least some of the plans deserve more serious treatment, not only because of the credentials of their proponents but because experience has demonstrated that organizational relations can have a crucial effect on policy, and vice versa. The analysis of one cannot and should not be separated from the other. Some observers may place too much faith in structural manipulation; others may need more of the seasoned practitioner's appreciation of the interplay between organization and substance.

The principal organizational ambition of most architects of the new Atlantic world is to reinforce the heart of the political process—the central political forum which represents, negotiates, and reconciles the policies of the member states. The maximalist view expressed in the 1962 Declaration of Paris calls upon the NATO governments to draw up plans within two years that would give particular attention to the following innovations: (1) the creation at the highest political level of a Permanent High Council on which all member states would be represented; (2) assignment to this body of the broadest possible jurisdiction, including economic, military, and cultural matters; (3) delegation to the council of authority to decide certain stipulated matters by a "weighted, qualified majority vote"; and (4) in the interim, reinforcement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization "as a political center" by giving it "additional jurisdiction" and the power to make certain decisions by weighted majority.

Underlying this approach is the assumption that, because of the increasing confluence of Atlantic interests, the arteries of national policy-making affecting major community problems should be joined more intimately under the guidance of a stronger collective brain, the proposed High Council. The scope of this body would be more expansive than has been typical of the North Atlantic Council, giving more attention to political, economic, and cultural as well as military questions. The status of the representatives to the Council would be elevated in order to obtain individuals closer to the source of policy leadership in their respective countries. *De jure* authority would, for the first time, be granted to make decisions by majority vote. Because of this increase in legal power, the pattern of voting strength would be altered to reflect more realistically the relative political power of the individual member states.

Another approach—partly maximalist, partly minimalist—would strengthen

the collective policy process but would do so primarily through a small caucus of the principal powers. This has been the gospel preached by General de Gaulle and a few others such as Viscount Montgomery and the Earl of Avon who have advocated a triumvirate of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France as a political counterpart of the NATO military standing group. This plan, it is argued, is the most realistic way to weight the decision-making process, encouraging the principal powers to exercise collective leadership in the larger Atlantic Community.

The typical minimalist position gives priority to encouraging the development of the European Community in order to create a more viable, secure, and responsible partner at the other end of the Atlantic partnership. Emphasis on the immediate creation of a reinforced Atlantic umbrella, warn the minimalists, may stunt the growth of the European Community, if not overwhelm it as some observers fear. They argue that, without a strong European Community, the individual European nations will be too weak and insecure to be effective or responsible partners—a major reason, it is said, for the present frustration of NATO. Furthermore, the United States, jealously chaperoned by Congress, is scarcely prepared for any bold flirtation with supranational government. The main emphasis, argue the minimalists, in addition to encouraging the European Community, should be on working out more satisfactory policies with the Europeans on such crucial matters as defense, trade, and aid rather than on dramatic organizational initiatives. In fact, much of what the maximalists want in the way of policy can be achieved within the present organizational framework, given the will to do it. To the extent that the minimalists consider immediate organizational improvements, they tend to emphasize relatively modest, evolutionary adjustments such as raising the quality of representation, strengthening the international staff, and improving the negotiating and communication process. This approach requires and permits special intimacy among the principal powers, but any attempt to dramatize this relationship would probably arouse more resentment on the part of those excluded than would be justified by any gains likely to be achieved.

Parliamentary Development

Following the footsteps of all architects of democratic government, including the founding fathers of the European Community, the maximalists emphasize the need for an Atlantic legislature to provide the vital connection between the peoples of the Atlantic countries and the new central structure. The Declaration of Paris takes a vigorous step in this direction by recommend-

ing: (1) conversion of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference into a "consultative Atlantic Assembly"; (2) selection of the members, not necessarily parliamentarians, by member governments, and election of a limited number of others by the governmentally chosen delegates; (3) more frequent regular meetings of this body than the annual meetings of the Parliamentarians' Conference; (4) authority for the assembly to review the work of all Atlantic institutions and to make recommendations to those institutions and the member governments; (5) provision for a "weighted vote" on defined types of recommendations; and (6) establishment of a permanent secretariat and an annual budget to maintain the work of the assembly on a continuing basis.

The maximalists hope that this reform will nourish the community with greater popular involvement and, hopefully, support. The same channel can be used to enable the central mechanism to exert stronger influence in the member states. This move is seen as an essential prelude to the development of truly supranational endowments for the Community.

The minimalists argue that the maximalists are again putting the organizational cart before the policy horse. The prerequisite for closer Atlantic political cooperation, they contend, is not a larger, handsomer show window but some solid substantive wares to display in it. This requires further development of European solidarity and a more adequate policy consensus on both sides of the Atlantic concerning key security and economic issues. Otherwise, strengthening the parliamentary sounding board will simply amplify discords that are already audible enough.

Conclusions

Forcing one's mind to free itself from the prison of immediate events and to take a broader view of the future and the past, one comes to the conclusion that strengthening the total web of Atlantic political relations is a central and critical part of the strategy of preparing the United States for the world of tomorrow. Continued access to the resources of the Atlantic nations is essential to the welfare of the United States—economic, social, and political as well as strategic—and, because of shared traditions and conditions, the Atlantic nations are those with which the United States can most readily and congenially collaborate. Scarcely any major concern of America is immune to the consequences of this relationship; virtually every significant interest—whether it be defense, commerce, or the general advancement of both the developed and underdeveloped societies—would benefit by such cooperation.

A long-range perspective requires, however, that the enterprise not be damaged by unduly ambitious or narrow policies. President Kennedy warned in

his July 4, 1962, address, "The greatest works of our nation's founders lay not in documents and in declarations, but in creative, determined action. . . . Building the Atlantic partnership now will not be easily or cheaply finished." Concerning the general orientation of the association, he added, "The Atlantic partnership . . . would not look inward only, preoccupied with its own welfare and advancement. It must look outward to cooperate with all nations in meeting their common concerns."[15]

While the United States should and does have the inclination to reinforce its political links with the other Atlantic countries, it is clear that neither the bulk of American leadership nor the public at large is yet ready for the formal surrender of any significant decision-making authority to Atlantic institutions. To say that such a development is desirable and feasible is not to deny that it will require painstaking and extended nurture. First, there must be more solid progress in evolving Atlantic understandings on major policy matters, especially defense, trade, and aid. Only on these foundations can a stronger political community be erected. It is appropriate that private citizens press for progress toward a more supranational association if the governmental behemoth is ever to be budged in that direction, but immediate progress must be looked for more in the area of relatively undramatic improvements in existing structures and processes.

Reinforcing the Atlantic political community need not and should not conflict with the basic development of the Six. It is legitimate to strengthen the Atlantic mechanism simultaneously and to use that instrumentality to encourage the Europeans to be as hospitable as possible to the outside world, but this should be done in a manner that will not undermine the further development of the European Community and the entrance of the United Kingdom into that grouping. Closer political relations can improve the Atlantic capacity to succor the developing nations, but every precaution should be taken to do this in a way that will neither alienate nor injure those countries. Finally, it should be understood that such a development is not inconsistent with continuing use of the United Nations; on the contrary, it should facilitate collective Atlantic cooperation with the United Nations whenever such action is appropriate.

[15] *The New York Times*, July 5, 1962.