

FREEDOM & UNION

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The Atlantic Core of Global Democracy

Articles by:

George Modelski

John Richardson

Serban Popescu

Gen. James Jones

Recent Events in Transatlantic Relations

July 6, 2006 *EU-US Summit highlights series of New Steps in Mutual Cooperation*

September 20, 2006 *EU-US Free Trade Agreement Mooted in Berlin*

Center-right members of the German government called for closer economic ties between the EU and the US, possibly resulting in a free trade agreement. Top CDU politicians - whose party is part of the ruling government coalition - are increasingly in favor of a transatlantic free trade zone which would be a great project for Europe and the German presidency.

October 30, 2006 *Stern Report.*

Release of voluminous economic modeling report on costs of climate change, by head of Britain Government Economic Service and former Chief Economist of the World Bank. It concluded that failing to curb the impact of climate change would spawn environmental devastation costing 5 to 20 percent of the world's annual gross domestic product. Current World Bank chief Paul Wolfowitz praised the report as introducing rational calculation into the subject. Tony Blair endorsed it as a wake up call.

November 29, 2006 *NATO Transformation Summit in Riga; NATO Response Force Declared Fully Operational*

January 10, 2007 *European Commission Proposes an Integrated Energy and Climate Change Package to Cut Emissions for the 21st Century*

The European Commission proposed a comprehensive new Energy Policy for Europe to combat climate change and boost the European Union's energy security and competitiveness. Setting a series of ambitious targets on greenhouse gas emissions and renewable energy, the package of proposals aims to create a true internal market for energy and strengthen effective regulation.

January 26, 2007 *North Atlantic Council meets at the level of Foreign Ministers*

On 26 January, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to increase civilian and military assistance to Afghanistan, as part of a comprehensive strategy to reinforce gains made.

February 2, 2007 *UN-IPCC Report underline need for global action on climate change*

The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published scientific evidence February 2, 2007, convincing many prominent doubters that the global climate is changing and that human activities have caused most of the changes in the past 50 years. The report warned that, without more action to limit greenhouse gas emissions, the global average temperature is likely to rise by a further 1.8-4.0°C this century, after increasing by over 0.7°C in the past 100 years.

February 8, 2007 *European Leaders Propose Single Trans-Atlantic Marketplace*

The German Chancellor Angela Merkel has proposed a plan to create a single unified marketplace between the US and the EU. Charlie McCreevy, the European Commissioner for Internal Markets has also backed the idea which focuses on standardizing international law between the US and the EU in order to increase global investment and trade. European officials believe that if the plan is supported by the US, a united US-EU marketplace could be created by 2015.

February 12, 2007 *US Congress takes up Global Warming*

The US Congress reduced the gap between U.S. and European policy, issuing several pieces of legislation dealing directly with climate change and environmental policy. Some of the bills create tax breaks and incentives for producing biofuels while others call for a cap and trade scheme, similar to that of the European Union. Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Rep. Henry Waxman plan to propose further aggressive climate change legislation in the House of Representatives by early June 2007.

February 15, 2007 *Broad international support for G-8 tackling Global Warming*

A group of global lawmakers from about 20 countries, including members of Congress, urged the Group of Eight industrialized countries to commit to a 2009 deadline when they next meet in June. The resolution called for a new agreement limiting greenhouse gas emissions by 2009 to succeed the Kyoto protocol, which is set to expire in 2012.

February 16, 2007 *Transatlantic Cooperation on Energy and Climate Policy*

The Environment Commissioner of the EU, Stavros Dimas, called for the European Union, the United States, and other developed countries to take the lead and to begin negotiations on a comprehensive global climate change treaty. Commissioner Dimas stated that a new framework for action must be agreed before current international commitments under the Kyoto protocol come to an end in 2012.

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
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Freedom & Union's Policy

To think, write and act always in terms of all the democratic world, and not of any country in it.

To mean by "we" (except editorially) the citizens of the coming Atlantic Union or Federation of All the Free, not merely those of any existing democracy.

We are proud to continue Freedom & Union's enduring editorial policy which is reprinted in part here in its original wording. – Ed.

Problems of Democratization

GEORGE MODELSKI



George Modelski, Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of Washington, is author and editor of a number of important books, including Long Cycles in World Politics. He is currently working on a project entitled “Globalization as an Evolutionary Process”. He has submitted this article for Freedom & Union and retains copyright.

Democratization is one of the central phenomena of our times. Let us bring together, with the help of an attractive image, some basic facts about it, viewing it as the process whereby democratic practices have been spreading world-wide for a considerable time now.

We set out to accomplish this task with the help of the image displayed on the next page that succinctly summarizes the information about the condition and the progress of democratization at various points in time in the past century and a half. By condition we mean to indicate the relative importance of democracies in the world picture. With progress we intend to show this to be a dynamic picture that opens out a window to the future.

The image “World Democratization” is simple but it displays this crucial information in two ways. First, it shows seventeen discrete data points (in red) that depict, at ten year intervals, the proportion of the world’s peoples that at that point in

time lived in democracies. The first of these data points refers to 1840, and indicates that in that year, some 3.9 per cent of the world population lived in democratic countries, and more specifically, in the United States, and the United Kingdom, the only two that could thus be described. By the year 2000, the last of the data points, following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, that figure had risen to 57.1 per cent, and the number of democracies, to 87.

The second feature of our table is more analytical, and traces (in blue) the best part of an S-shaped curve that not only fits our “hard” data quite accurately but also extends well into the future, to the 22nd century. We might

call this the learning curve of world democratization.

Here we have two sets of basic information; so what to make of it?

Let us highlight four of its features: democratization is a powerful process; it is world-wide, it has a long reach in time, and it might be seen as a

We are at present ‘ahead of the curve’ (on the spread of democracy); the greater urgency lies with consolidating the gains of the recent past, and solidifying the links among

learning experience. We then ask: what are the implications of these arguments?

A powerful trend

A glance at the seventeen actual data points confirms, first of all, that these are not scattered or random bits of information but rather a series or sequence pointing to the existence of a trend, and not just any trend but one that is persistent and powerful. Viewed over a time span of 160 years, the trend shows both ups and downs, and registers some setbacks (including a notable one centered on the 1930s, and World War II), but overall it moves clearly, and strongly, upward. In absolute numbers, the expansive force of democracy is simply staggering, from some 40-plus million in mid-19th century, to close to 3.5 billion people at the turn to the 21st. A trend of such power is not easily reversed, or aborted.

A world-wide trend

In our chart, democracy takes off as a transatlantic project, and for a long while, appears, in the main, as a “Western” phenomenon.

But over time, and since the mid-20th century, its spread has been to most parts of the world, and (as shown) it now engages more than half of the world’s population. It has diffused via a demonstration effect because, by and large, democracies, work better, know better how to cooperate, win wars but do not engage in mass killings, fight hunger more effectively, and, on the whole, are more productive and more prosperous. That makes democratization a likely universal process spreading by imitation.


A long-term trend

Our poster “World Democratization” covers more than two centuries, making it plain that while undoubtedly powerful, this is a process whose progress is measured, deliberate, even slow, and not really to be hurried. It took over a century for democracy to move from a “market share” of under ten per cent, to a majority position (in which India plays a large role) a few years ago. We suppose that for the bulk of the world system to be ‘saturated’ with democratic practices it will take

many decades, and the path taken by China will be a key factor.

A learning process

Roughly connecting the dots in our chart is a blue line in the generic form of a learning curve. That curve marks not just the path of world-wide democracy over the past century and a half but also projects that path forward one century into the future, on the assumption that what we are observing is a learning process: humans settling into a cooperative mode; humans learning to live with each other. That strongly suggests that the trend we have chartered is not just a summary of events past but a process of some regularity that (jointly with others) is likely evolutionary.



Shows, at ten-yearly intervals, the proportion of the world population living in democracies (left scale). Fitting the data is a classic learning curve. Graph by T. Devezas, based on data in: “Democratization in long perspective’ revisited” by G. Modelski and G. Perry III, *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 69 (2002), 359-376.

Democracy has for some time been a subject of contention between foreign policy Idealists and Realists. Idealists advocating the spreading of democracy speak sometimes in grandiose terms of principle, even morality, point to the record of successful societies and claim to represent the wave of the future. Realists warily eye the problems of the

day, discount the future and counsel prudence. Our presentation suggests that both sides score in that argument and that both are in effect right.

Implications

What are implications, for the next decade or two, of these basic facts about democratization?

First, if democratization is indeed such a powerful process then it might be expected to proceed, we might say, under its own steam or as might be

Number of nations scoring 8 or higher on the Polity IV scale 1800-2003




Figure: Polity Scale Measurement of Democracies, 1800-2003

This Polity IV graphic provides independent confirmation of Modelski's graphic displayed on the previous page. Polity is a widely used data series for political science research. The latest version, Polity IV, contains coded annual information on regime and authority characteristics for all independent states from 1800 to 2003.

put more technically, as a form of self-organization. That is, in the ordinary course of world events, humankind seems on track, gradually, albeit slowly, to build a growing domain of democracy, and that is why what is called for, above all else, is patience. There is no "duty to export democracy" nor is there any requirement for extraordinary measures such as costly military interventions, or risky preventive wars, to foster it. Arguably, such measures are likely to prove counter-productive rather than facilitative.

Indeed, as we look at the chart once again, we see that the point reached in the year 2000, a high point of the entire story, and following the spectacular expansion of democracy at the end of the Cold War, is well above the trend line (or the learning curve). That suggests that we may be

'ahead of schedule', and that a slowdown of the process could well lie ahead. And that suggests **caution**.

Second, and if in fact we are at present 'ahead of the curve', then the other watchword must be **consolidation**. The greater urgency lies with safeguarding and solidifying the gains of the recent past, and building up the links among existing democracies. That might take two forms: protecting the elements of the emerging global democratic community, and continuing to strengthen the institutions that have proved their value and effectiveness.

The elements of an emerging global democratic community are now in place. They include North America, the European Union, India, Japan-Korea, and Australia-New Zealand: components of what might be called an 'oceanic' grouping whose linkages are not due primarily to geographical propinquity but rather to participating in long standing networks of social, maritime and air connections. This is a prosperous and active ensemble now accounting for the majority of the world's population but its cohesion is not to be taken for granted and must be assiduously maintained in the face of rising pressure on at least two fronts: the demographic and the Islamist. Population might soon start declining both in Europe, and in Japan, reducing their weight in the democratic world. Democracy, moreover, is under challenge from the Islamists, and the Jihadists, notably so in the Middle East, but also Europe and in Central Asia.

In more narrowly political contexts, the way to consolidate the gains of the past is to cultivate, and to strengthen the institutions that have proved their worth in the past century. One example is NATO that since its inception in 1949 has been animated by strong transatlantic relationships; the organization has expanded its membership and could of course broaden its functions. Then there are the Bretton Woods institutions, and indeed the entire United Nations system that has strong potential for democratic development. In all of this, of course, the role and policies of the United States remains of key significance. □

A Democratic World Order

From Streit to the Present

JOHN RICHARDSON



John Richardson, a graduate of Harvard Law School, has served as Assistant Secretary of State, CEO of Radio Free Europe, founding staff member of the United States Institute of Peace, and founding Chair of the National Endowment for Democracy.

At Harvard in the 1940s, I joined “Union Now” and “Union Now With Great Britain,” popular movements led by Clarence Streit advocating a merger of the major democracies as a force for peace and security in the face of the Nazi onslaught in Europe.

After the war, what little attention I paid to the outside world centered on the emerging United Nations system and in Clarence Streit’s intriguing idea of moving toward a democratically based world order.

The first President Bush was ridiculed when he suggested, following the brief 1991 Persian Gulf War with Iraq, that our triumph heralded a ‘New World Order.’ That skepticism was justified. Americans instinctively knew there was no vision, no idea, no strategy, to make that victory a signifi-

cant step toward a better world. Both President Clinton and the second President Bush have too often been similarly ridiculed, in America and abroad, as trigger-happy incompetents, unable to capitalize constructively on American pre-eminence.

Too many American political leaders fail to appreciate the necessity of working over the

After the war, what little attention I paid to the outside world centered on the emerging United Nations system and Clarence Streit’s intriguing idea of moving toward a democratically based world order.

long term with like-minded leaders of other democratic nations to develop international decision-making arrangements reflecting our shared values and responsive to the human needs of our rapidly shrinking ‘global

village.’ The contrast is striking with the wisdom displayed by those who visualized and created the United Kingdom, the European Union,

Canada, Brazil, Australia, as well as Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) bolstering European recovery after World War II.

What is to be done? What should be the long-range global vision and strategy guiding the policy makers of the United States and other responsible governments as they make tough foreign policy choices?

To make such fundamental policy choices, more than tactical skills and courage are required of our Presidents and Congressional leaders. Management gurus have been telling us for a generation that without a long-range vision, clear goals, and appropriate strategies, organizations are not likely to get very far. Lacking thought and debate about what kind of world we want for future generations, we Americans and our friends abroad are not likely to get very far either. Our government, like others, would continue to react to situations as they arise rather than steadfastly pursuing strategies and tactics designed to move us toward the long term vision of a harmonious world of democratically governed nation states, working collaboratively together within democratically based institutions. But for such an approach to be accepted by democratic nations around the world, leadership is crucial, and only the US Government provides an adequate platform, given American power and prestige. A President and Congress willing to proclaim such vision and strategy, establishing such a sense of direction for Americans and other freedom lovers around

the world, will have some potent precedents to build on.

I believe it is only a question of time before an American President will have the foresight and courage to challenge the skeptics, to make history, by using the ‘bully pulpit’ to move America and the world toward a clear vision of human solidarity to be achieved through a democratic world order. The recently formed democratic caucus in the UN General Assembly provides a first crucial step toward the eventual limitation of UN Security Council membership to genuine democracies. The Security Council might thereafter rely on NATO to enforce its decisions, with all that would mean for global peace and security.



Destruction of the Berlin Wall, 1989
ITAR-TASS News Agency, 1989

The recently formed democratic caucus in the UN provides a first crucial step toward the eventual limitation of UN Security Council membership to genuine democracies. The Security Council might thereafter rely on NATO to

Americans, together with hundreds of millions of others around the world who share our faith in liberty, would gladly work toward a world of cooperating, and ultimately, integrating sovereign self governing nations. Their democratic governments would collaborate, based on shared national values, through existing and new international institutions, in a long term movement toward regional federations and, ultimately, a global, democratically-based federalism. Since human rights, the rule of law, social justice, free elections, free markets, and peace are especially attractive to people denied them, such a global political movement would also weaken tyranny wherever it exists.

This is no panacea. Prudence compels us, as argued by Richard Haass' book, *The Opportunity – America's Moment to Alter History's Course* (Public Affairs, 2005) also to pursue 'integration' with other important countries, regardless of their democratic credentials. There will always be blunders, failures, disasters, as well as achievements, in the long road ahead. But as the rate of change toward greater integration in all global systems – technological, economic, social, cultural, and political – continues to accelerate, the only critical mistake would be to fail to establish such an American sense of direction and leadership in world affairs.

American business, labor, and civic leaders, teachers, clergy, journalists – indeed citizens in every walk of life – can contribute to a positive outcome by finding ways now both to demonstrate their support and to increase American 'soft power' to help achieve that goal. Through this and other channels, momentum for positive change can, and I believe will, grow until American political leaders accept their responsibility to employ our power to move the world toward peace, justice, security, and freedom – toward human solidarity – through democratic

development, collaboration, and integration.

This sums up what I have learned about American and world politics since I floated down under a parachute into battle across the Rhine near the village of Wesel, Germany, on a bright Sunday morning in March, 1945.

Long before that, my mother had engraved the message of Tennyson's prophetic lines from his poem 'Locksley Hall' in the memories of her five children:

*For I dipt into the future, far as human eye
could see,
Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder
that would be;*


*Till the war-drum throbbed no longer, and
the battle-flags were furl'd
In the Parliament of man, the Federation of
the world. □*

From John Richardson's recently published memoirs, A New Vision for America, pp. 167, 221-2, 241-5 (complete bibliographical information below).

A NEW VISION FOR AMERICA: Toward Human Solidarity Through Global Democracy

By John Richardson
Foreword by John C. Whitehead

*ADST-DACOR Diplomats and Diplomat Series,
Ruder Finn Press, 2006*



Stronger Political Structures for NATO

GENERAL JAMES JONES

Outgoing Supreme Allied Commander Europe



General Jones (left) and North Atlantic Council Members on a visit to Kosovo, May 2006
NATO photos, 2006

The outgoing Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in a parting session with the Atlantic Council of the U.S., has called on December 21, 2006 for strengthening NATO's structures and reliability for the long haul. He focused on two aspects of this, which have long been central to the project of the Streit Council: using more efficient joint decision-making procedures than the past reliance on consensus, and using common funding so countries can participate in common actions without a financial penalty. The complete address can be found on the Atlantic Council of the US website. Following are the key portions of his remarks.

On the matter of transformation: as well as we've done on the military side, the other piece of transformation that has not been done to the secretary-general's satisfaction or to anyone else's is the accompanying transformation of the political process. The political institution of NATO to support this expeditionary capability is still very much in the 20th century as a military capability is becoming a 21st century force. And those two things are kind of at odds.

Beyond Consensus

My recommendation and my parting message to NATO, for whatever it's worth, is that we really take a look at the second piece of transformation now and start fixing the system so that as NATO becomes even bigger, that the political processes by which decisions are taken, by which we decide how we spend our money or how we acquire

things, can, in fact, be somewhere in parallel with this new state-of-the-art capability that we're trying to get to in the military side.

Fred Kempe (President, Atlantic Council of the US): What you're basically saying is that the political is falling behind the military capability. So,

NATO will have to address whether you want 350 committees all acting on the rule of consensus.

21st century military capability and aspirations and 20th century political consensus. What concretely needs to be done on the political consensus side? Is it doing away with consensus voting on decisions?

Jones: How we spend our money, what we spend our money on is definitely still in the 20th century. And sooner or later, NATO will have to address whether you want 350 committees all acting on the rule of consensus. Is that really how you get your best advice? At some point, if the North Atlantic Council gets bigger and bigger, they'll

have to address that.

Kempe: One gets rid of consensus. That means that the French and others don't have the ability — as a single country — to block NATO going forward.

Jones: Well, you do have to ask yourself that. If you've got 24 countries lined up and want to do something of a certain stature, what's the logic of one or two countries being able to block that? Why not have a system where they can just opt out? Which is actually what many countries did in supporting the NATO training mission in Iraq. There are quite a few countries that said: Okay, we'll support the mission, but we're not sending any troops there. And we said: Fine, we'll do it. Those are some of the flexibilities that could come NATO's way and ought to be discussed, so that the institutional part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can in fact support what we're trying to do to make NATO more agile, more responsive and more capable.

Common funding

One of the things that I would add to the list — particularly for rapid missions, expeditionary-type operations, NATO Response Force missions — is that I believe common funding is the answer. I believe that we have to remove the disincentives for nations to contribute forces.

For example, the Czech Republic has one of the few existing assets in chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological forces. We can't expect the Czech Republic, every time an NRF goes out, everybody wants that capability, to foot that bill the whole time.

NATO operates under the "costs fall where they lie" principle, which means if you contribute forces, you pay for it. And that was great in the 20th century, because forces weren't going anywhere. It was a reactive alliance. We were going to absorb the first hit. And every year maybe forces went from Germany to Holland or, you know, moved a few hundred miles, but they really

didn't go very far. So having nations absorb that cost was not particularly difficult.

Now you've got, you know, 32,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. You have a mission in Africa. You've got Operation Active Endeavor. You've got troops in the Balkans. Nations are having to absorb that burden.

Political interference in Military Advice due to consensus procedure

I think the Military Committee of NATO, which is supposed to give the military advice, is in danger of becoming overrun by the early input of political influence before the military advice is developed. And I think we ought to organize ourselves in such a way that the military advice that is rendered stays as pure as possible until there is an appropriate time for the political process to take place.

The advice comes from the strategic commanders as an operational commander, for example, into the Military Committee. And the Military Committee's system of discussion is very similar to the North Atlantic Council's. In other words, countries can break silence, countries can block military advice from going forward. It's the infusion of national politics on military advice at a very low level that causes military advice to be distorted, to be tweaked and to lose its essence. And I think it has to be pure.

I think there are ways in which you can do that. Some structural reorganization could be done that preserves the integrity of that military advice for a little bit further into the process.

Strong alliance

Still, the alliance is an incredibly healthy organization. I know of no countries that are trying to leave the alliance, and I know quite a few that are trying to queue up — to measure up to achieve full membership by as early as 2008. □

We have to remove the disincentives for nations to contribute forces. I believe common funding is the answer.

The Other Case for Transatlantic Integration

SERBAN POPESCU

Romania's recent EU accession increases the number of member countries diplomatically strained by a complex balancing act between the US and the EU. With its staunch commitment to both Atlanticism and Europeanism, Romania found its diplomacy torn by the EU-US rift caused by Operation Iraqi Freedom. It sought to keep itself on the shrinking — sometimes disappearing — common ground between the US and EU, and more fundamentally, between the need for security guarantees and the need to improve its economic performance. Serban Popescu, a Romanian Atlanticist, relates here how the problem has developed. He concludes that increased transatlantic cooperation on economic and security issues would narrow the perceived gap between the military and economic dimensions.

The case for transatlantic economic and security integration has been traditionally argued from the perspective of the benefits accruing to the US and Western European countries as a result of closer relations. But the recent waves of NATO and EU expansion to Central and Eastern Europe have brought in a novel category of states that can make a similar argument from a different perspective. These states keenly seek out security and economic development guarantees and are heavily influenced in their quest by historical challenges of a kind unlikely to strike a familiar chord with either Western European countries or the US.

The relative lack of transatlantic integration at

the economic and foreign policy levels is likely to strain the diplomatic approach of the less influential countries that have joined the transatlantic community, hitherto based on a Euro-Atlantic synthesis that had seemed solid since both its halves — European and Atlantic — entailed looking westward. Among the new EU members, US-EU frictions inadvertently promote foreign policy trends based on inward-looking calculations of national gain, qualified commitment to wider regional projects, and loss of trust in the stability of the transatlantic community and in its capacity for defending their national interests. Given the security anxieties that some countries in

Central and Eastern Europe still display, the stark choice between choosing to go along either with the EU or with the US can engender divergences in loyalties.

Since there are not enough treaty commitments and institutional channels to mitigate foreign policy disagreements among major transatlantic actors, smaller European countries may end up displaying a disposition to support projects on a purely contextual basis, as long as their national interest is served. While there is certainly nothing wrong with conducting

diplomacy in order to advance the interests of one's country, the European project of integration is built on the belief that calculations of national interest are ultimately best served in a union.

This working assumption of the EU conveys no paradox and even less a repudiation of the concept of national interest. The European idea is that, unless



Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov, Prime Minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg, Foreign Minister (and Atlantic Club founder) Solomon Passy and EU-Affairs Minister Meglena Kuneva sign the European Union Entry Accord, April 25, 2005
Sofia News Agency, 2005

cast against the backdrop of shared values and perspectives, a country's pursuit of its own interests, conceptualized as a fundamentally solitary quest for transitory alliances whose basic tenets are open to revision, will lead, as it has so many times in the European history, to confrontation and loss of status for each and every European country. It will prove, in the end, detrimental to the very interest it sought to protect and advance.

Atlantic disunity undermines EU internal unity

In this respect, the possibility that newer EU members will try to navigate their way through the rocky rifts of the EU-US relations by seeking only provisional accommodation of largely inconsistent diplomatic stances does not indicate merely an ideological discomfort with the theoretical framework on which the European Union is modeled. It can spell a more practical threat: that the Union itself enters into a stage of slow fragmentation which can foreshadow a regional return to rank realpolitik, even if the administration in Brussels will try to uphold as long as possible a semblance of institutional unity.

As long as recent EU members will be forced to address American and Western European demands piecemeal, without feeling safe in the knowledge that there is a wider structure where potential head-on conflicts can be addressed and settled, they will unavoidably provoke acrimony in those European governments that view themselves as the founding members of and the driving force behind the Union. Senior EU members will feel entitled to demand loyalty from the very countries that they welcomed to the EU accession process. They will also tend to respond with dour criticism to recalcitrant behavior that threatens to frustrate their expectations. In the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, French President Jacques Chirac rebuked the ten Central and Eastern European countries that signed the Vilnius letter in support of the U.S. position on Iraq by bitingly commenting that these countries were "badly brought up and somewhat insouciant about the dangers implied by allying themselves so rapidly with the American position." President Chirac singled out Romania and Bulgaria as "particularly irresponsible" and stated that the

two countries could not have found a better way to diminish their EU accession chances. There were certainly a host of reasons behind this statement that relate more to French positioning in the EU, its post-WWII legacy of decreasing influence, and its idiosyncratic relation to the US. But there was also a clear feeling that the soon-to-be-members are not as strongly pro-EU as they should be.

Small countries in paradoxical situation

Romania is a good example of a European country whose strategic options are severely limited by the gaps in transatlantic integration. Minor power status is normally complemented by a restricted range of strategic options, but, in the present case, transatlantic disagreement further shrinks the already narrow space of diplomatic accommodation to zero, or literally somewhere below zero: the options are at times rigidly defined by an either-or choice between the US and the EU, with neither choice acceptable to the country but all space for compromise eliminated. As has always been the case in history, frictions among major powers tend to be amplified in minor countries to an extent that may appear excessive to the very parties engaged in the initial disagreement.

Romania illustrates the dilemmas of a country having to cope with an unwieldy diplomatic burden in times of transatlantic disagreement. Its post-Communist foreign policy has been built on the premise that national security is best served by the country's accession to both NATO and the EU. While the former was to provide the security umbrella, the latter was meant to guarantee economic stability and growth. Long before it formally joined NATO on March 29, 2004, Romania was an enthusiastic supporter of strengthening the alliance's role in regional conflicts, even when this implied souring relations with its neighbors, as was the case when Romania supported the 1999 NATO campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The desire to see NATO intensifying its operations in the region, in the hope that this will increase the country's security profile, should have been a clear indication to Brussels before the Iraq War that such expectations shape the Romanian diplomatic agenda.



Romania officially entered NATO on March 29, 2004. Image: Romanian soldiers carrying the Romanian and NATO flags. BBC, Associated Press, 2007

At the same time, the country pursued a campaign to secure EU membership, a goal achieved at the beginning of this year. Economic integration was thought to be the natural counterpart to acquiring the security boons that flow from membership in NATO. But Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ensuing transatlantic disagreement put in doubt the expected coherence between the two dimensions. Security concerns already visible in the country's prior support of NATO operations in the region were magnified by a recent history of territorial instability. The modern state of Romania is a newcomer in historical terms. Formed in 1859 by the unification of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, the state saw its territory repeatedly expand and decrease during the two world wars. A bleak national variant of Communism after 1945 compounded the difficulties of a rough start. The combination of these historical factors led Romania to emphasize the security side and thus come to strongly support the US decision to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom.



Romania became an EU member on
January 1, 2007
Associated Press, 2007

The problem is structural

The staunch support for the operation is usually associated with the confrontational style of the Romanian President Traian Basescu. Announced in the wake of winning the presidential runoff, his surprisingly ambitious design to build a Washington-London-Bucharest security axis was frowned upon in Brussels (the President signally forgot to mention Brussels, Paris or Berlin). Yet the decision to support Operation Iraqi Freedom was taken in the previous Social-Democrat administration. As troubling as President Basescu's manner could be considered in Brussels, the decision to grant preeminence to security issues is not his innovation, but reflects a constant of post-1989 Romanian diplomacy. As a result of siding with the US, Romania was not shown the same lenience as that granted to regional neighbors, which gradually moved away from the US stance on Iraq. When Romania and Bulgaria were assigned the commissioner seats in the European Council, many saw more than mere coincidence in the fact that Bulgaria was bestowed the position of EU Commissioner for Customer Protection, while Romania was allocated the vastly irrelevant portfolio of EU Commissioner for Multilingualism.

The inherent danger in such situations is that the more countries such as Romania are scolded for their foreign conduct, the more they become convinced that EU membership is not as valuable as they initially thought and that complete loyalty should be required only if it is fully reciprocated. At the same time, geography indicates that as warm as Romanian-American relations can be, expected gains from the trade between the two countries cannot possibly offset the potential benefits of trade relations between Romania and the EU.

Structural solutions

The tension between security guarantees and economic development can be defused by an expansion of the transatlantic agreements. A common US-EU security policy structure would supply a framework where disputes could be aired and tackled. It would also serve to disprove the notion that the EU can provide security only in the form of peacekeeping and stabilization missions. Substantial elements of it could be developed in the coming period around NATO as an operating instrument and around joint security concerns such as WMD non-proliferation; the entirety of it is likely to require gradual evolution.

Similarly, a common transatlantic market would do away with the related notion that the US can only be a security provider to Central and Eastern Europe. The US and the EU still account for 50 per cent of the world's GDP, and 40 percent in terms of purchasing power parity. Eliminating unnecessary hurdles could boost trade to the point where newer EU members would come to appreciate the US as an economic partner, via their membership in the Union. An OECD study forecasts a GDP increase in the EU and the US of up to 3.5 per cent from unhindered trade. Complemented by strong security cooperation, such robust growth could dissolve the dilemma of choosing between being safe and being affluent. It could also make countries like Romania confident that the military and the economic dimensions of national security can once again become fused on their diplomatic agenda. □

Global Threats, Atlantic Structures

Report of the Streit Council Conference, September 2006

The Streit Council, along with the Hudson Institute and Radio Free Europe, organized on September 21-22, 2006 the conference “Global Threats, Atlantic Structures.” Featuring a roster of high-level officials from both sides of the Atlantic, together with prominent academics and think tank analysts, it discussed how Atlantic institutions can be strengthened and transformed for dealing with new threats to the Western democracies and new opportunities for commerce and unity.

The conference was opened by former Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Maria Aznar. Speaking of the necessity to translate ideological agreement at the level of policy making, Mr. Aznar stated that he believes “in a West which is not only a Community of abstract values”, but also “a Community of joint institutions and, above all, of joint actions.”

For the second day, the conference organizers posed two broad questions to the participants: how the Atlantic institutions can be used and adapted to help face the threats, and how the need to face the threats can be used to upgrade Atlantic integration for the long run. Among those addressing these questions were Antonio Martino, Italian Defense Minister 2001 to 2006; Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense; General William Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency; Prof. Charles Kupchan, Council on Foreign Relations, and Daniel Hamilton, Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University.

The discussion on the second day started with the session “Building a Transatlantic Homeland Security System.” Daniel Hamilton, the Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS, noted that Europe and the US for a time have diverged regarding both the security risk posed by terrorism and the fundamental approach to this phenomenon. Europeans are less inclined to view terrorism as a predominant threat and they approach it as an issue of crime and justice, unlike the US that conceptualizes it primarily in terms of war and peace. However, European differences with the US over threat perception are narrowing; transatlantic communications are working in this matter.

Dr. Hamilton emphasized that we have to protect “our con-



Erik Johnson of the Streit Council opens the conference and introduces Prof. Niall Ferguson of Harvard.



Dr. Stella of the Streit Council introduces Dr. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense



Jose Maria Aznar, Prime Minister of Spain, 1996-2004



Dan Hamilton, Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS, with Don Jensen, RFE, and Clark Ervin, Aspen Institute



Ellen Frost, Institute of International Economics and Bruce Stokes, German Marshall Fund



Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs



Julianne Smith of CSIS and General Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency

nectedness across the Atlantic”, “the critical functions of society that link us together”. He contemplated a new role for NATO, arguing that a terrorist attack on the territory of a NATO member be a challenge under Article 5 of the Charter which requires the alliance to protect its space. He stated that NATO’s invocation of Article 5 on Sept. 12 established the fact of a Common Homeland to be defended, potentially making Homeland Security a new dimension of NATO work.

The next session, “Building an Atlantic Economic Community”, featured comments from Bruce Stokes, international economics columnist for *The National Journal* and fellow at the German Marshall Fund and the Pew Research Center. Challenging skepticism about further economic integration between the US and Europe, Dr. Stokes reminded everyone that “the transatlantic economy is the deepest and broadest bilateral relationship of the world” and cautioned that, without an enhanced Atlantic dimension, “the multilateral trade system cannot produce the kind of economic benefit we all hoped for.” In the period since the conference, Stokes has become a significant figure in advancing German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s goal of a Transatlantic Common Market.

Peter Rodman’s address, “A New Architecture for the New Era”, examined the role that the transatlantic institutions can play in addressing new security concerns. As US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, he held that the role of “the Atlantic world” was “vital as ever” and spoke of the natural inclination of “Atlantic nations” to ally themselves in facing common challenges. “It’s a habit, but it’s a lot more than habit and its rationale did not disappear with the end of the Cold War”, he said. “We really have no choice.”

Julianne Smith, senior fellow and deputy director of the CSIS International Security Program, took the view that NATO can provide the vanguard in the fight against terrorism during a session on “Transforming NATO for the Global Struggle on Terror and Proliferation.” After pointing out that the current NATO mission in Afghanistan substantiates the claim that NATO has gone global, she noted that influential politicians, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, had already argued that NATO needed to codify this transformation by rewriting its Strategic Concept.

A session on “Forging an Atlantic Identity” concluded the con-

ference. Describing himself as a “sober Atlanticist,” Charles Kupchan, Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, defined the Atlantic community as a “security community”, meaning one that has “a shared sense of we-ness or commonality”. He cautioned that the political elites on both sides of the Atlantic have unfortunately failed to learn “how to disagree more agreeably” and in recent years have instead become focused on a narrative of opposition. While believing that the divergence “is here to stay”, Professor Kupchan finished by making an impassioned plea to “figure out what the next era of transatlantic relations looks like” and to preserve “the anchoring formation in the global system”, the partnership between the United States and Europe. □



All conference materials are available online at:
<http://www.streitcouncil.org/content/activities/events/Global%20Threats.htm>



Richard Arndt of the Streit Council introduces Prof. Kurth and Prof. Kupchan



Antonio Martino, Italian Defense Minister 2001-06, delivers the conference closing

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
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The Streit Council Advisory Board is pleased to

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Richardson has been a World War II paratrooper, Wall Street lawyer (Sullivan & Cromwell) and investment banker (Paine Webber), CEO of Radio Free Europe, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational & Cultural Affairs, CEO of



Youth for Understanding (homestay exchanges for high school students), founding staff member of the U.S. Institute of Peace, founding board member and Chair of the National Endowment for Democracy, and board member of many other educational and service organizations. He currently serves on the board of the Council for a Community of Democracies, the International Rescue Committee, American Forum for Global Education, the Social Science Foundation at the University of Denver, and World Learning. He is a graduate of Harvard College and Law School.

George Modelski

Modelski is a Professor of Political Science Emeritus in the University of Washington, Seattle. Polish-born, he was educated at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he received a B.Sc. in Economics,

and earned a Ph.D. in International Relations (University of London). His principal appointments were at in the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Australian National University, Canberra, and since 1967, at the University of Washington, where he taught international Relations and World Politics. His visiting and research appointments included those at the University of Chicago, Princeton University (Center of International Studies), Harvard University (Center for International Affairs), the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, Stockholm University, and University of Catania. Among the books he authored, co-authored, edited or co-edited are *Principles of World Politics*, *Long Cycles in World Politics*, *Sea power in global politics*, *Documenting Global Leadership*, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, *Leading Sectors and World Powers*, *World System History*, and *World Cities*. His research interests include evolution of global politics, world system history, and democratization. The current project is "Globalization as an Evolutionary Process." A past member of the Seattle Committee for a Community of Democracies, he now resides in Washington DC.



Ettore Greco

Greco is Deputy Director of the Institute of International Affairs, Rome, and currently a visiting Fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. He is an expert in Transatlantic relations; Foreign and security policy of the EU; the EU's enlargement and its constitutional reform; Balkan issues; and Italy's foreign policy. He received his M.A. from the University of Pisa; Diploma, (1983) Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa. Previously he served as Head of the program on Central/ Eastern Europe and Russia, Institute of International Affairs, Rome; Visiting Fellow, WEU Institute for Security Studies; Visiting fellow, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. His publications include: "Fifteen Proposals for a Bipartisan European Policy in Italy," with T. P. Schioppa and S. Silvestri, in *The International Spectator*, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Transatlantic Debate," with R. Alcaro, and G. Gasparini, *Quaderni IAI* (February 2006), *The International Role of the European Union*, ed. with R. Balfour (Gaeta: Artistic Publishing Company, 2003), "CFSP Reform and Transatlantic Relations," in *Connections* (September 2003).



Current Streit Council Fellows

Maggie Hummel joined the Streit Council Fellows Program in January 2007. She received her Bachelor's degrees at Franklin and Marshall College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in Government and Spanish in May 2005. She has also studied in Madrid, Spain, gaining extensive knowledge and strong interest in Spanish politics in the context of the European Union and transatlantic relations. She is currently a first-year Master's student at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. She hopes to gain greater understanding of the roles of experienced democracies in promoting democratization and liberalization in developing countries.



Riccardo Monaco, SC Fellow since January 2007, has a Law degree from the University of Rome *La Sapienza*, with a specialization in European Union. From 2002 to 2004, he collaborated with the *Istituto Affari Internazionali* (IAI) and the *Archivio Disarmo*, conducting extensive research on European Law and armaments procurement; integration of European industrial/technological base; proliferation of small arms and light weapons; NATO and American defense policy. He obtained a Master's degree at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, PA, with a thesis on terrorism and counterterrorism. He has also worked in the Legal Department of the European Ombudsman in Strasbourg, France.



Serban Popescu, SC Fellow since January, is a PhD candi-

date in Philosophy at Central European University, Budapest, Hungary. He holds a Bachelor's and Master's degree in Philosophy from the University of Bucharest and a Master's degree in Nationalism Studies from Central European University. He has also worked with the Center for Future Security Strategies, Hudson Institute and published an EU pre-accession report on Romanian immigration on the website of the Center for European Policy Analysis. His interests include NATO reform and transatlantic security coop-



eration.

Jason Rubin, SC Fellow since January, is working on his MA in International Affairs, with a focus on Europe and Eurasia, at The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs. He earned his BA in Sociology from UCLA. In 2004 he was an intern in the Regional Security Office at the U.S. Embassy in Rome, Italy. He has worked as a research assistant at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, researching the link between economic aid and trade policy in reducing global poverty. His interests include European integration and the role of intergovernmental institutions in global govern-



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