The Streit Council

A series of international events spanning the last 15 years has resulted today in a heated debate about NATO. Those pivotal international events that have affected the Atlantic debate the most include: the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991; the Balkan wars of the mid-1990s which exposed serious gaps in Europe’s military effectiveness; the 9-11 terrorists attacks in 2001 which announced the arrival of a new and deadly global enemy and which generated much pro-American sympathy; the 2003 controversial invasion of Iraq which raised profound anxieties about America’s propensity for rejecting its Allies wishes and interests; and the train and bus terrorist bombing in Spain and the UK in 2004 and 2005, which suggested that the terrorist regard Europe and America equally as targets.

The Atlantic debate places special emphasis on the future of relationship that the US maintains with the European countries within NATO and within the European Union. Three arguments stand out from the charges and critiques that have been hurled against the Atlantic Alliance. The first focuses on military capabilities, meaning that the European partners in the Alliance are far too weak and too inept militarily. The skeptics here make much of the fact that the Europeans lack America’s incomparable ability to move whole modern armies from one corner of the globe within a matter of days. In response to this critique it should be mentioned that the Europeans bring other skills to the table. These less spectacular capabilities, for example in terms of peacekeeping operations, are in fact more frequently needed. However Europe has performed quite well as a valued and reliable partner in several recent military undertakings.1

Policymakers and scholars have spelled out several suggestions about how to integrate and develop European security forces into NATO. The establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), resulting in a force that will be deployed where NATO as a whole is not involved, is an excellent first step. A mechanism within NATO that will institutionalize various “coalitions of the willing” within the Alliance, should also be explored.2 Another important reform affects NATO funding, so that the central fund covers all costs of the Alliance, rather than the institutional costs only.3 This will make sure that European allies fairly share the burden of financing NATO’s capability, now inequitably born by the USA.

NATO’s goal was widely perceived as being the deterrence of the Soviet Union. This goal may be regarded now as accomplished. So if the goal has been achieved, what reason would be left for maintaining NATO? First, the original mission of the Atlantic Alliance which ended up with the establishment of NATO, was not the deterrence of the Soviet Union. The Atlantic Alliance dates back to the World War I and did not mention Russia as an enemy. Indeed, Russia’s membership may represent a fulfillment of the original Atlantic Alliance. Furthermore, security threats will always exist in global affairs and the disappearance of the Soviet Union does not mean the world is now a perfectly safe place. Especially at a time when Islamic terrorism has assumed center stage as the gravest international security threat menacing the whole world, it would be folly to junk one of the most effective security alliances in history. The creation of specialized agencies to combat terrorism has demonstrated the capability of small, specialized agencies to fill the gap of international cooperation 4. Agencies dealing with terror financing, international fraud and law enforcement, the threat of WMD, non-proliferation, and even development aid, would be suitably placed under the umbrella of NATO, as this is the only pre-existing organization that can show both a propensity towards action, and the necessary political and institutional know-how.

The third critique of the Atlantic Alliance is divergence—the assertion that clear fault lines, disagreements, and differing perspectives are rampant across the Atlantic Alliance today. The response begins with an admission: the existence of divergence is quite undeniable and even inescapable. Indeed there are dramatic examples. An American example is the statement of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld terming “old Europe” the group of European allies opposing the war in Iraq. European dissatisfaction with aspects of the relationship are laid bare by the recent slew of carefully crafted scientific polls, all revealing that “anti-Americanism” has reached high, unprecedented levels in Europe. Notwithstanding this rising tide of unhappiness on both sides of the Atlantic, much of the disagreements may signify little more than a more equal and healthier Alliance and the benefits, ties, values and interests that flow from the Alliance far outweigh the divergence that divides and hobbles it.

NATO is as relevant today as it was before 1990. Its role falls squarely in that area where the US and the EU should “lead the effort to build structures of international governance that are necessary to address the transnational challenges of the twenty-first century5.

More about Transforming NATO

Looking to the Future: NATO Training Mission-Iraq
by Rick Lynch and Phillip D. Janzen, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 40
May 2006

“The Alliance has struggled to apply outdated mechanisms and policies to the fluid environment of the out-of-area support mission... The most significant lesson from this mission involves supporting political pronouncements with political will. At the Istanbul Summit, all 26 members committed to support the government of Iraq “with the training of its security forces” and sought further proposals for that support “as a matter of urgency.” This statement soon rang hollow as political consensus was overshadowed by political posturing over involvement in Iraq.”

The article highlights a series of problems flowing from current funding and decision-making procedures: “With each step, from the reconnaissance mission in July 2004 to the delay in funding for the training institution at Ar Rustamiyah, some countries have capitalized on the Alliance regimen of consensus to block significant advances. Not only has the mission been needlessly delayed by political debate, but these debates consume immense energy and focus from all levels of command. … The lesson is that once the political decision is made to commit national treasure and personnel … for a NATO-led operation, ensuing operational decisions should not be held hostage to the political process. This may require rethinking the 50-year policy of consensus decision-making. When even the most picayune operational decision requires a 26-member consensus, any nation can block progress on overarching objectives with the wave of a finger. For example, some Allied nations that stood behind the Istanbul pledge to support Iraq and have contributed to out-of-country support have also in practice politically blocked progress on the main effort of in-country training. The lesson is clear: once the commitment is made and plans are approved, nations must be obligated to support the efforts politically if not materially.”

The articles stresses how the growing gap between strategic and operational concepts on the one hand and funding mechanisms on the other may indeed lead NATO operations to disaster: “The Alliance is well into the transformation process from a static defense organization to a more flexible, deployable mechanism for operations in and out of Europe. The NRF concept and its inherent structures illustrate how NATO is transforming into a more responsive joint and combined force. However, as the command structure and strategic and operational concepts have rapidly evolved to meet changing threats, financial support mechanisms have not adapted. For example, the concept of “costs-lay-where-they-fall” restricts participation to countries able to pay, while excluding willing but less financially capable members. This drastically reduces the pool of force contributors while burdening contributors. A related and misunderstood financial concept is NATO common funding. Common funds and nationally borne costs are separate sources. However, in reality, both are paid from the same pool of resources, national defense budgets. In essence, NATO pays both ways—through common funding or a member’s own purse. The idea of trust funds to support an operation is also fraught with disaster. Announcing support for an operation plays well in the international arena; however, trust funds allow nations to avoid any financial obligation associated with their verbal pronouncements. A nation can politically support an operation at absolutely no cost to its own treasury. Trust funds also attract an even more complex political dimension: the caveat. Contributing nations can place restrictions and constraints on the use of their contributions, creating an unwieldy system of accounting checks and balances. NATO should revisit its funding policy, which penalizes contributing nations by forcing them to pay for their participation. The use of trust funds is also a growing failure. NATO has committed the political capital of the Alliance and all 26 nations represented to train Iraqi officers. It is now prepared to squander that capital by failing to fund the commitment…. These are just a few operational issues directly related to funding that highlight what any military thinker will understand. Without adequate financial resources, and the flexibility to apply those resources at the decisive points in an operation, mission failure becomes a strong possibility.” Read More

Atlantic Council of the USA, Transatlantic Transformation:Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture, 2006

Rebecca Johnson, Micah Zenko, All Dressed Up and No Place to Go: Why NATO Should Be on the Front Lines in the War on Terror, Parameters: US Army War College, Winter2002-03, Vol. 32 Issue 4, p48, 16p.

Philip H Gordon, Reforging the Atlantic Alliance, National Interest; Fall 2002 Issue 69, p91, 7p.

R.J Aldrich., Transatlantic intelligence and security cooperation , International Affairs, July 2004, vol. 80, no. 4, pp. 731-753(23).

1 Nicholas Burns, Conference “ Europe ’s Global Role”, Brookings Institution, Wednesday, 11 May, 2005

2 Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress: NATO and the European Union, 6 April 2004

3 Radek Sikorski, European Outlook, AEI: “European Defense Reform: The beginning of the Beginning”, 17/7/04

4The US and Europe fight terror financing, Center for Transatlantic Relations Conference, June 10, 2004

5 James Steinberg, Brookings: An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations, Survival, vol. 45, no 2 Summer 2003