Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress: NATO and the European Union, May 2005

The report notes the disagreement between the EU and the current administration in the US , over the use of coalitions. While the EU favors the preservation of a consensus structure in NATO, the current administration favors a “coalitions of the willing” approach.
It notes: “Some allies contend that the United States is seeking to use NATO as a “toolbox”…They argue that the Administration’s contention that the “mission drives the coalition” undermines allied solidarity; such a doctrine weakens the long-held view that all member states must believe that they have a stake in allied security operations”.
The disagreement is well known; what is interesting from the CRS report is the subtle but clear suggestion that there must be some compromise between the two attitudes. Such a compromise, it is suggested, should allow for more functionality without working to the detriment of solidarity between members of the alliance. The report refers to the ESDP formulation that speaks of the ability of the EU to deploy “where the alliance as a whole is not involved”. (This formulation sprang from the St. Malo meeting, although it originates in Ministry of Defense (UK) White Papers).
What inevitably follows, is that the creation of “coalitions of the willing” that would allow NATO to work as a toolbox, should be institutionalized rather than simply accepted or rejected. To this end, the internal experiment of the EU with enhanced cooperation, or a deal along the lines of the Luxembourg Compromise, would be a very promising starting point. These suggestions allow, in effect, the creation of ad hoc coalitions, while also protecting the solidarity of EU member states. A similar formula should be explored in NATO.
From a functionalist point of view, the change would allow the transfer of authority to a “central” body, without jeopardizing national interest. A look at the EU as an initial model should be very promising.
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Congressional Research Service, NATO's decision making procedure, Report for the Congress, 2003

"One system used in elements of EU decision-making is drawing interest from those in NATO who support coalitions of the willing and capable. For issues that involve only selected governments, the EU has devised “committees of contributors.” In this concept, governments that wish to participate in a project receive general approval from a principal EU governing body to proceed among themselves, while the other governments take a general interest and a responsibility that might involve oversight. An element of the concept involves “constructive abstention,” in which governments with interests not directly affected stand aside and permit action by those with interests that are directly in play.
A “committee of contributors” in NATO might follow a similar outline, and might appeal especially to governments that are both NATO and EU members. Countries on the committee for a military operation, for example, would be those willing to contribute troops and other assets. The committee would formulate a general plan for operations, and submit it to the NAC for a “blessing.” The NAC might allow the committee to use NATO assets, such as AWACS and the planning staff. The NAC, in effect, would endorse the right of committee members to act in their own interests, but not specifically endorse the operation itself. Committee members among themselves could then make key decisions, possibly based on consensus, such as how much authority to delegate to SACEUR for contingency planning and target selection. The committee would keep the NAC informed on a regular basis. Should the NATO Response Force (NRF), comprised of 25,000 troops, be fully developed for “expeditionary” operations beyond the Treaty area, “committees of contributors” could be a means to streamline decision-making and keep it within the ken of interested governments."
This proposal would preserve the effectiveness of NATO decision making in a difficult moment for the alliance. More importantly it can be regarded as a concrete step toward the adoption of the majority rule within the NAC, a necessary move in the direction of a more federalist NATO.
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