

## **The Two Ways to Unite Atlantica- the Federal and Functional**

Clarence K. Streit, Freedom & Union, July-August, 1963

TWO BASIC METHODS of uniting Atlantica have been proposed. One is known in Europe as the "Functional" plan, and was dubbed "Operation Dumbbell" by its State Department supporters before the present Administration called it the "Partnership" plan.

This approach begins with the military function, and proceeds with the economic and then the monetary functions before attempting greater political unification than alliance. With the exception of the military alliance, which began on an Atlantic scale in NATO in 1949, it would move first toward achieving European Union by this piece-meal or step-by-step method before attempting Atlantic action. Above all, it would wait until Europe had achieved by federation a strength comparable to that of the U. S. Federal Union before it would unite politically, by an undefined "bar" of "partnership," the two equal spheres, and thus complete "Operation Dumbbell."

This approach has enjoyed official support on both sides of the Atlantic ever since the war. It has been put into action not only on the military alliance side in Atlantica, but in the European Common Market. Both these experiments, after being hailed as great successes, are now in grave difficulty; for all practical purposes this whole approach has been blocked ever since the de Gaulle avalanche in January.

The other approach is the federal or constitutional one. It holds that the political, military, economic and monetary affairs of Atlantica form an organic whole which should be tackled together by taking first the political decision to set up a "multi-nation" federal government-one in which all the existing nations of NATO would be directly represented-to handle common affairs in all four fields, and whose first task would be to work out the gradual but simultaneous transition to a common Atlantic defense force, market and currency. This approach is the one that Federal Union, Inc., has urged since 1939. Although it has not yet been tried in Atlantica, it is the approach which the 13 States took in 1787-89, and has stood the test of time on a vast scale for nearly 200 years.

There are obvious arguments in favor of both approaches. Obviously, too, the advance of each helps the other. Thus, the NATO military alliance, by making Atlantica a concrete reality, and the Common Market by its successes, have both helped make Atlantic Union seem more practical to an increasing number of skeptics. On the other hand, such European functionalists as Jean Monnet have acknowledged that they drew their original inspiration from the broader vision of Atlantic Federal Union they gained from reading *Union Now* in 1939. The functionalist program would not seem SO practical and evolutionary to many were there not the more revolutionary Federal Union approach to

make it appear by comparison relatively moderate. And since all those whom Federal Union converts necessarily support any intermediary step toward it, the greater the support Federal Union gains, the more easily and rapidly the functional approach can advance.

The two approaches supplement each other in another important respect: They help assure that Atlantic unification will advance by one road or the other, as conditions change. When there is relatively little pressure of necessity, the slower functional approach is more practicable. But there is no telling when events will make much swifter and stronger action essential, and the Federal Union expressway becomes the more practicable as events and enlightenment convince people that time is short.

Thus far, the functionalist approach has had much greater concrete success to point to than has the other. This is not, however, a fair basis for comparison of the real merits or practicality of the two approaches, for the functional method has long had the powerful support of the U.S. and other governments, and also of great American foundations. Federal Union has never been given even the proverbial crumbs from the table of any government or great foundation.

### **Achieved Much Despite Adversities**

No President or Secretary of State since 1939 has, while in office, suggested publicly that it might be well to study the possibility of uniting Atlantica by the approach the Founding Fathers followed; they have all shrunk from even once mentioning the word, federal, in relation to U. S. relations with any other democracies. Nor has any great foundation yet given even \$4 for one year's subscription to the magazine, Freedom & Union, that upholds this approach—although most big university libraries have subscribed since it began in 1946.

The Federal Union approach has had to be opened and maintained steadily through so many years despite these and other handicaps, with the organization's annual income ranging from a high of \$101,256, to a low of \$26,098. Despite all these handicaps, it has achieved much. Consider:

The idea that the democracies around the North Atlantic form a community that must be organized, which it pioneered and maintained singlehanded for 10 years, took concrete form in the Atlantic alliance in 1949, and has now become firmly established.

Another idea Federal Union pioneered was that of holding an Atlantic convention, modelled on the Federal Convention of 1787, to explore greater unification as an organic whole, rather than piecemeal or functionally. This effort led to an act passed by Congress in 1960 after 12 years of consideration, and signed by President Eisenhower, which resulted in the meeting of the Atlantic Convention in January 1962. This Convention, composed of 90 eminent citizens of the NATO Nations, endorsed the non-functional approach with this urgent recommendation:

"That the NATO governments promptly establish a Special Governmental Commission to draw up plans within two years for the creation of a true Atlantic Community, suitably organized to meet the political, military and economic challenges of this era,"

The present Administration, persisting in the piecemeal partnership approach despite mounting difficulties, has thus far ignored this recommendation.

### **Rockefeller Promotes Federalism**

Meanwhile, however, Governor Rockefeller has come out strongly for the federalist goal in his book, *The Future of Federalism*, (Harvard, 1962), In it he declares: "The federal idea, which our Founding Fathers applied in their historic act of political creation in the 18th Century, can be applied in this 20th Century in the larger context of the world of free nations-if we will but match our forefathers in courage and vision." Richard Nixon urged "political confederation" for Atlantica in addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors last April,\*

Events have also testified to the validity of the over-all federalist approach, The interrelation of the political, military and economic factors in the problem was strikingly proved when they combined to cause the de Gaulle veto of British entry in the Common Market and the blocking of further development of the "partnership" plan in any function.

Refusal to recognize that the economic, military, monetary and political factors are as inextricably related as the digestive, muscular, circulatory and nervous functions of the body, and need to be considered as a whole, is now endangering Atlantic unification all along the line.

The Administration's plans for organizing Atlantica as a twin partnership has been blocked on all sides, political, military and economic, and in both its European and Atlantic areas. Britain's entry in the Common Market was the essential next step in the creation of the proposed United States of Europe. Without Britain it could not become equal in power to the U.S.A. Nor could there be the necessary "practical" assurance that its power would be tied as closely as possible-without federal union-to Washington, and not be "inward-looking" economically or a third force politically and militarily.

It should not be forgotten that even before the de Gaulle veto, there was grave doubt that Britain would agree to the terms for entry in the Common Market. Such influential statesmen as former Prime Ministers Eden and Attlee, and Lord Salisbury and Lord Boothby, had all recently voiced serious misgivings from the political and democratic standpoint, and expressed their preference for an Atlantic solution. The great advantages of the Atlantic alternative to European federation were being increasingly understood in London and Canada. Moreover, Labor Party opposition to entry in the EEC, which Harold Wilson led, had already gained the upper hand. There seems little reason to believe that a Labor Government would reach agreement with the Common Market even if President de Gaulle did not stand in the way.

In these circumstances, the addition of Britain to the Six, which Jean Monnet and the Kennedy Administration have rightly called so "essential" to the safe and successful working of the partnership plan, has become much too problematical to be in the realm of practical affairs now.

Meanwhile, the Administration's hopes of solving its economic problems by the Trade Expansion act have been blocked by the de Gaulle veto, and the subsequent Geneva meeting left cause for deeper pessimism. All this adds to the danger to the dollar and pound-with its threat to the economy of Atlantica and the world-as does also the nuclear arms situation.

Not merely the policy of General de Gaulle but the growing strength of Western Europe, combined with the atomic danger and the lessons Europeans have drawn from the Cuban brink, make it increasingly difficult for the U.S.-despite all the gimmicks it is trying-to achieve its military aims. These are to retain the atomic driver's seat in Atlantica, prevent the spread of atomic power, and persuade Europe to carry at least its share of the burden in conventional weapons.

U.S. policy today, as reflected by President Kennedy's Frankfurt speech and other recent indications, seems to be: 1) To continue the gimmick, piecemeal approach; 2) to dig in particularly as regards Operation Dumbbell (keeping all our eggs in its partnership basket, ignoring all the warnings of the dangers in this Operation, giving no answer whatever to any of the objections made to it, and continuing to dismiss without a hearing the Federal Union alternative, despite its long-tested success and impressive present support; ) and 3) to seek to remove the de Gaulle roadblock by hinting at the U.S. transferring to his German partner the special relationship he resents so much our having given the British.

### **Fallacies of German Partnership**

To attempt to hasten European federation by basing U.S. policy more on the country it fought twice in recent years than on its major democratic allies in those wars would seem fore-doomed a) to alienate London as much as Paris, b) to worsen both Atlantic and European disunion, c) to drive Poland and Czechoslovakia closer to Moscow from fear of the German-dominated European Union it conjures up.

Certainly, the Administration's policy threatens, at best, to relegate to the far future the realization of Operation Dumbbell, either by deferring indefinitely its pre-requisite Anglo-European federation-through failure to remove the de Gaulle and Labor Party road-blocks to this, or by causing worse disunity all round.

A year ago, when many thought that British entry in the Common Market was probable soon, with European Union a decade around that corner, and Atlantic partnership possible a few years later, it was not so hard to understand that Washington should concentrate on Operation Dumbbell, and dismiss Atlantic union as too distant to be "practical politics." In present circumstances, however, it would seem the height of folly not to turn to the Atlantic Federal road and explore searchingly at long last the immense possibilities this

alternative offers. There is nothing to be lost-not even time-in doing this while the partnership road is blocked, and there is everything to be gained.